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INTRODUCTION 
A new technology of interpretation is taking the legal world by 
storm. Legal corpus linguistics, an approach generally unknown in the 
field until a few years ago, has suddenly become a focus for articles, 
conferences, legal briefs, and even judicial opinions. Taking 
advantage of evolving computational approaches and data collection 
 
 * Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Contact: 
anyabern@buffalo.edu. Many thanks to the editors for organizing a stimulating and 
enjoyable symposium, and to the Michigan State faculty for hosting a series of 
generous and productive workshops. 
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abilities, legal corpus linguistics searches big data sets of language use 
to help interpret legal texts.1  
Legal corpus linguistics is technological. It uses vast collections 
of language use examples, demonstrating a very contemporary interest 
in big data. It compiles those big data sets through various means, but 
 
 1. Interest in computational linguistics as a method for analyzing legal 
meaning dates back to the 1990s. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. 
Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretations 
of “Use a Firearm,” 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1174 (1995); Jeffrey P. Kaplan et al., 
Bringing Linguistics into Judicial Decision-Making: Semantic Analysis Submitted to 
the US Supreme Court, 2 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 81, 81 (1995). But excitement has 
intensified dramatically in recent years, both in scholarship and in court, as 
technological developments have made large data sets easier to assemble and access, 
spurred the evolution of search methods, and allowed for the emergence of corpora 
with built-in search functions that open up corpus searches to untrained users. See, 
e.g., Vijay K. Bhatia et al., Legal Discourse: Opportunities and Threats for Corpus 
Linguistics, in DISCOURSE IN THE PROFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS 203 (Ulla Connor & Thomas A. Upton eds., 2004). See generally 
Christoph A. Hafner & Christopher N. Candlin, Corpus Tools as an Affordance to 
Learning in Professional Legal Education, 6 J. ENG. FOR ACAD. PURPOSES 303 (2007); 
Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279); Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-
Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010); Stefan Höfler & 
Michael Piotrowski, Building Corpora for the Philological Study of Swiss Legal 
Texts, 26 J. FOR LANGUAGE TECH. & COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 77 (2011); Thomas 
R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 795 
(2017); Friedemann Vogel et al., Computer-Assisted Legal Linguistics: Corpus 
Analysis as a New Tool for Legal Studies, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1340, 1350–55 
(2018) (providing a cross-national review); Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, 
Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 
GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 491, 496 (2020); Call for Papers: 5th Annual Law and Corpus 
Linguistics Conference, BYU LAW, https://corpusconference.byu.edu/2020-home/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YRM-5XQB] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (announcing a call for 
papers for the fifth annual BYU conference); Clark D. Cunningham, Foreword: 
Lawyers and Linguists Collaborate in Using Corpus Linguistics to Produce New 
Insights into Original Meaning, 36 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. vi, ix–xii (2019) 
(introducing journal symposium issue on legal corpus linguistics with papers 
developed from presentations at a related conference). The increased political power 
of plain-language and textualist approaches to legal interpretation surely contribute to 
this interest as well. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311–12 (2018) (noting the prevalence of textualist 
techniques among younger judges); Lawrence M. Solan, Corpus Linguistics as a 
Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress, Some Questions, 33 INT’L J. FOR 
SEMIOTICS L. 283, 284 (2020); Anya Bernstein, Legal Corpus Linguistics and the 
Half-Empirical Attitude, 160 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (explaining why 
legal corpus approaches are particularly attractive to textualists). 
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many involve either digitizing and collating historical texts, or 
automating the collection of more contemporary material, for instance 
by continually searching the Internet for new entries. It uses computer 
programming techniques to help annotate those texts, allowing each 
term to be labeled as a part of speech. Other computer programming 
techniques allow users to search the database, locating individual 
words and phrases within vast collections of language use examples. 
Being able to search databases to collect a wealth of instances of 
people using particular words in various contexts helps researchers 
understand how those words are usually used. Proponents argue that 
this knowledge allows legal corpus practitioners to give empirical 
grounding to claims about ordinary meanings that pervade legal 
interpretation. This technology, the argument goes, gives us access to 
what the words that appear in statutes really mean to people, making 
legal meaning-making less subjective, even “scientific.”2 
This Article challenges this new prevailing wisdom, puts legal 
corpus linguistics in the context of other meaning-making 
technologies, and suggests an approach for analyzing any technology 
of language in the law. One of my aims is to caution against 
technological exceptionalism—a view that computerized, automated, 
or big-data approaches are somehow special, perhaps more 
trustworthy, less subjective, and most likely to succeed. Rather, I 
argue that we should ask the same questions and make the same 
demands of any method of interpretation.  
Any technology, after all, is only as useful as the way it is used: 
Technology depends on technique. So even when using or analyzing 
a new technology, we should ask some old questions. What are the 
means this technology employs, what are the ends it claims to reach, 
and does it convincingly relate the two? What are its premises, what 
assumptions do they rest on, and how do they structure interactions 
with the object of analysis? What other options are available and how 
do they compare? 
Technology, in this sense, is not neutral nor passive. It is not just 
an effect yielded by external causes like scientific development. It is a 
cause in its own right. Because of this causal power, it is particularly 
important to examine the underlying assumptions that help construct, 
and are perpetuated through, a given technology. And this causality is 
 
 2. Brief for Professor Clark D. Cunningham & Professor Jesse Egbert as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5, In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(No. 18-2486) (calling corpus linguistics “a scientific discipline”) [hereinafter Brief 
for Cunningham & Egbert]; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics 
Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 57, 57 (2016). 
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true of old-fashioned techniques as much as of newfangled ones. The 
high-efficiency washing machine and the simple washboard are both 
technologies of clothes washing and should both be subject to the 
same interrogation about means–ends relations, built-in assumption, 
broader effects, and comparative advantages. To elucidate these 
points, I first draw on theorists who have influenced our 
understandings of the production of knowledge and technological 
development.3  
I then introduce legal corpus linguistics, describing its origins in 
academic linguistics and the somewhat different way it has been 
practiced in legal interpretation.4 Having laid this groundwork, I ask 
how we should evaluate this emerging technology and its role in legal 
interpretation. I argue that legal corpus linguistics fails to coherently 
relate its methods, questions, aims, and claims. It promises more than 
it can achieve. That mistake, moreover, is not costless. The 
methodology inscribes a peculiar view of legal meaning: a narrow, 
asocial, and abstracted notion of things that are in fact broad, social, 
and practice-based. The illusion of simplicity that legal corpus 
linguistics propagates undermines our evolving understanding of the 
real complexities of law and leaves out participants and contexts that 
are crucial to the production of law as a social force.5  
To probe its implications further, I then put legal corpus 
linguistics in the context of some other ways of giving laws meaning.6 
I choose two that sit at the extremes of simplicity and complexity: 
dictionary definitions on the one hand and administrative rulemaking 
procedures on the other. These may seem unrelated or 
incommensurable at first glance. But in fact, they all are technologies 
of legal interpretation that should be considered in comparison to one 
another. Comparison also helps illuminate those aspects of legal 
corpus linguistics that fit it snugly into particular legal ideologies, but 
blind it to the realities of how law functions in society.  
I. TECHNOLOGIES OF LEGAL MEANING 
The term technology can indicate a broad range of meanings, 
most with a vaguely vector-like feel to them. It tends to convey 
something that rushes forward into the future, evoking a feeling of 
 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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progress and often depending on some sort of machinery that exceeds 
the merely human. Even better, a particular kind of machine: 
computers, especially when they do things without constant human 
input. If the computer seems to be taking over human activities or 
replacing human judgment, that computer surely qualifies as 
technology. Discussions of technology often have a breathless quality, 
as though there were no time to waste: Who can bother with analytic 
niceties in the face of onrushing progress? Technological innovations 
are sometimes treated with a kind of apocalyptic urgency, as though 
everything were up for grabs, up in the air, falling on our heads as we 
speak. And that means we need to get on board or be left behind—or 
mangled under—this unstoppable juggernaut. When people talk about 
technology, they sometimes sound like they are standing in front of a 
speeding train that is about to run them over.  
Here, I prefer to step off the tracks. While new tools can lead to 
real changes, any technology is always part of numerous larger 
systems of practice. It emerges from them, reflects them, and 
influences them even as it remains influenced by them in turn. So, the 
notion of technology should have a broader, more pervasive sense than 
that of machines, computers, or even innovation in general. Especially 
in the realm of law, it is important to remember that technologies are 
human creations that work with other human creations. If they help 
give meaning to law, they do so as part of a longer-term human 
enterprise of meaning-making.  
I take technology not as a term for gadgetry but as a way of 
describing how things are done, how people and things are brought 
together and brought under control. This broad notion of technology 
replaces some ultimately unsatisfying definitional work—just how 
automated, mathematical, or gadget-y must something be to qualify as 
technology? Rather, my definition focuses instead on the ways legal 
meanings emerge from social processes. 
Most importantly, keeping our understanding of technology 
broad allows us to develop the questions we would want to ask for any 
way of doing things—new or old, mechanized or not. And that, I posit, 
will help produce realistic evaluations of whatever it is we analyze. It 
helps analysts avoid being over-awed by the fact that something seems 
new, or uses unfamiliar software, or produces results at the click of a 
mouse. Instead, we can see how different approaches relate to and 
compare with one another along the parameters that matter to us—not 
the parameters with which technologies advertise themselves. 
1246 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
A. Presupposing, Entailing 
My approach to thinking about technology draws on several key 
lines of thought. Michel Foucault talked about “technologies” as 
techniques for solidifying knowledge and power relations. Most 
centrally, Foucault understood technology “to refer not to tools, 
machines, or the application of science to industrial production, but 
rather to methods and procedures for governing human beings.”7 
These modes and procedures might inhere in how people organize 
production or communication, how they shape individual conduct to a 
norm or subjugate individuals to structural power, or how they 
transform themselves for their own purposes.8 For Foucault, each of 
these is “a matrix of practical reason,” that is, a set of practices enacted 
for certain purposes on certain understandings.9 Law, of course, 
participates in each of the four social areas Foucault highlighted. 
On this approach, technology is characterized by practices of 
control that render things visible and knowable, and therefore 
available to discipline, control, and further study. It is often embodied 
in micro-practices—small, hidden habits that invisibly structure our 
conduct and our relation to the world.10 In that sense, technology is 
never neutral. It also does not simply accomplish the end for which it 
is deployed and then stop. Rather, it has ongoing effects on the 
situation in which it emerges.  
There are a number of ways in which technology has 
reverberating effects. For one thing, technological forms affect people 
in ways that exceed whatever localized purpose they are designed to 
address. A factory work schedule may start out as a way of ensuring 
that the necessary people are present to make the widgets and that 
production runs smoothly. But it has wider effects than that. The 
schedule structures those people’s lives and affects their family 
relationships (when they see a spouse, who cares for their kids); their 
physical state (whether they eat when they are hungry, whether they 
walk in the sunshine); their social lives (whom they can hang out with, 
 
 7. Michael C. Behrent, Foucault and Technology, 29 HIST. & TECH. 54, 55 
(2013). 
 8. See Michael Foucault, Technologies of the Self, Lectures at University 
of Vermont (Oct. 1982), in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF, Jan. 1988, at 19. These are 
what Foucault called technologies of production, sign systems, power, and the self. 
See id. at 18–19. 
 9. See id. at 18. 
 10. See Jana Sawicki, Heidegger and Foucault: Escaping Technological 
Nihilism, 13 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 155, 160 (1987). 
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when they can hang out); and even their self-understandings (whether 
they see being at work early as a sign of virtue, whether they see those 
with no clock-in time as a different category of person).  
A factory owner may or may not mean for the schedule to have 
those sorts of effects. But what some person means to accomplish with 
a technology is not really so important. We cannot, after all, control 
the effects of our actions in the world.11 The point is that the 
technology of scheduling has effects on bodies, souls, social worlds, 
values, and institutions. And those effects far exceed the widget 
production that the schedule itself directly controls.  
There is another, related way that technology is nonneutral and 
nonpassive. The fact that this technology is deployed, rather than some 
other, has effects. Technology is part of “how it [is] that certain 
questions become important” while other questions that could have 
been pursued are instead devalued or ignored.12 The things that a 
technology focuses on, highlights, or makes visible are more easily 
available for further study, control, and valuation. One does not quite 
need to think that technological means suggest their own ends, but it 
is a little like that.  
Technologies make certain things relevant to particular 
processes—for instance, counting, monitoring, evaluating—and those 
things then often come to seem important, in general, to form objects 
of interest quite aside from the end to which the technology was 
originally deployed. Pushing certain subjects from being merely 
relevant to some particular project to being important in some trans-
substantive, overarching way is one way that technologies structure 
the worlds around them. If technological means do not exactly provide 
their own ends, perhaps one can instead say that technological means 
suggest other ends that then drive the development of further 
technological means.13  
 
 11. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 237 (2d ed. 1958) 
(describing action that has effects on the world as both irreversible and unstable: the 
meanings and implications of action exceed our control in ways we can only 
ameliorate, but never overcome, through “promising” and “forgiving”).  
 12. See Sawicki, supra note 10, at 162. 
 13. These ways of being nonneutral are related to the way that technologies 
incorporate values, assumptions, and knowledges that surround their creation, often 
in opaque ways. See generally, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: 
HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018) (discussing 
how algorithmic decision-making builds in assumptions about value, propriety, and 
social stature); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 2–3 (1993) (noting that algorithmic sorting systems for 
economic decision-making are “based on theoretical models that reflect quite 
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A technology can thus clear a path for path dependence. To stick 
with the schedule example, the widespread use of schedules for work 
might push people to focus on how much time people spend working, 
and to use the length of time at work as a way to evaluate their 
performance as workers or even their worth as people. And it may 
make less visible other questions we could ask—what the quality of 
the work product is, or how the person contributes to workplace 
morale, or whether they further the cause of workplace ethics or 
provide a model of well-rounded living, or many other possible 
questions that might end up never being asked because the technology 
has no use for them.14  
In sum, it is sometimes tempting to think of technology as 
something mechanically complex but philosophically simple: a tool 
someone uses to achieve a particular, limited end. But technology is 
neither neutral nor bounded in that way. Technologies affect both 
people’s conduct and their worldviews: how they act; what they find 
worthwhile; and what they do next. In this way, a technology’s effects 
reverberate beyond its immediate purposes or context of use and into 
the ongoing development of practices and ideologies.15  
B. Maintained by Multiple Participants 
Analyzing a technology thus involves more than looking at how 
it achieves the end to which it is put. It also requires asking how it 
 
transitory fads or trends in social, economic, and political thought” but continue 
sorting on that basis even as those trends pass).  
 14. This echoes the way that identifying a particular area of life as a “system” 
can affect the values that are then applied to it. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems 
Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 419, 421 (2018) (“The analysis of a metaphorical or figurative social 
system, in contrast to a real or tangible system such as an engine or a military weapon, 
is inevitably going to involve choices . . . that are . . . normative and political in 
nature.”).  
 15. I do not mean the term ideology to deride or devalue; rather, I use it to 
indicate broadly the ideas that give phenomena meaning. As Ian Hacking, following 
G. E. M. Anscombe, has noted, “some of the things that we ourselves do are intimately 
connected to our descriptions” of them, and such “actions under a description” are not 
understandable without taking into account how they are described—what ideas are 
applied to them. Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 
166 (Mario Biagioli ed., 1999) (citing G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957)). In this 
sense, ideology “is characteristic of any sociocultural phenomenon.” Michael 
Silverstein, The Uses and Utility of Ideology: Some Reflections, 2 PRAGMATICS 311, 
313 (1992). “[I]t must inhere in what makes any social entity . . . cohere as that social 
entity . . . [;]” in fact, “there is no such thing as a social fact without its ideological 
aspect . . . .” Id. 
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affects broader contexts outside of those ends, and even how it 
structures the construction of further goals and practices. Here I find 
it helpful to draw on Bruno Latour, whose work has brought attention 
to the multitude of participants that must be mobilized in order to 
deploy a technology, or produce a truth, or reach a legal conclusion.16 
Participants, moreover, are not limited to the human beings who 
implement the technology, or even those who feel its effects. For 
Latour, many of the most important participants to any technological 
process are not human beings at all. They may be animals, or germs, 
or algorithms. All those things have effects in the world, and the power 
and endurance of any technology depends on such nonhuman actors.  
Latour’s basic axiom is that it takes way more than a village to 
produce an effect, even if we often think of it as a “social” effect. It 
requires a kind of mass mobilization. For instance, in the area of 
disease, our understanding of germs forms part of their being in the 
world. But we did not get that understanding all by ourselves. If you 
just look at the decision-makers, or even just at the human beings, you 
will miss a lot. Think of the role that bacteria play in our lives now. 
They are very powerful: they make us wash our hands, heat our milk, 
take our anti- and pro-biotics. Reaching this level of efficacy took a 
lot of different participants in many processes. It took, of course, a 
genius like Louis Pasteur. But it also required bacteria themselves to 
participate in his experiments. Making that participation possible 
required the experimental apparatus that allowed those experiments to 
bear results. The laboratory had to be developed as a space particularly 
organized for doing and controlling experiments. Other people had to 
recognize that experimental results could have broader meanings 
beyond the confines of the laboratory. And so on.17 Each of these steps 
and participants was important—perhaps necessary—to producing 
our current bacterial regime.  
Latour challenges us to not know the relative importances of 
entities ahead of time. Instead, he wants to follow the links connecting 
 
 16. For a concise and readable introduction to Latour’s thinking, see Ilana 
Gershon, Bruno Latour (1947—), in FROM AGAMBEN TO ŽIŽEK 161–62 (Jon Simons 
ed., 2010). See generally BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW 
SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987); BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING 
OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT (Marina Brilman & Alain Pottage 
trans., Polity Press 2010) (2002).  
 17. See BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE 40 (Alan Sheridan 
& John Law trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (1984) (“[D]istinctions among types 
of actors matter less than the fact that they are all renegotiating what the world is made 
up of, who is acting in it, who matters, and who wants what. They are all creating . . . 
new sources of power and new sources of legitimacy.”).  
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entities to one another. After all, it’s not like we just up and decided 
one day to start washing our hands and boiling our milk. The germs, 
through our ongoing interactions with them, restructured our world: 
bacteria helped make us the people we are. Although human beings 
came to understand bacteria through Pasteur’s work, understanding 
was hardly the only outcome of those interactions. Just as we 
constructed our idea of bacteria, the bacteria have reciprocally helped 
construct us. If we just look to Pasteur, we will miss most of what goes 
into making germ theory viable and making it stick.  
In fact, Latour insists that making things stick—producing truths 
and practices that endure—is a terribly difficult process. It is not 
enough that something just happens to correspond to some reality or 
have some effect. Producing a truth or a technology that is recognized 
as such and treated as such, requires a lot of care and concern and 
effort and, especially, mobilization of participants.18 When Latour 
broadens the scope of analysis to take into account the important 
contributions of human and nonhuman actors who help make truths 
and technologies stick, he insists that there is no absolute way to rank 
the relative importance of these different participants. Some may look 
more important from one angle, less from another. Without a 
predetermined order of importance, the truths and technologies we are 
accustomed to can look less secure; there is less we can take for 
granted. Latour aims to make readers aware of the dense networks 
connecting the construction of ourselves to the construction of facts 
that matter to us—the theory of evolution, maybe, or the effects of 
pollution. These matters of concern require constant nurturing to 
maintain their status as things that have effects; otherwise, they might 
be deconstructed out of existence. And because of the multidirectional 
co-construction of entities, part of us would go with them.  
Latour’s premise and exuberant research agenda have a number 
of fascinating implications for both scholarship and political action. 
For my limited purposes here, Latour’s approach helps highlight that 
any technology is a participant in numerous social (as well as 
nonhuman) processes, regardless of what its inventors or users intend. 
It reminds me to keep my horizons broad when I ask what gets 
mobilized in the deployment of any technology and what effects it has. 
It asks me to focus not just on decision-makers or even those affected, 
but also on the connections that put things in relation to one another.  
 
 18. See Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters 
of Fact to Matters of Concern, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY 225, 227 (2004). 
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It also reminds me that the intentions of the people involved are, 
not exactly irrelevant, but not special: an intention is just one more 
participant that can get involved in the deployment and effects of a 
technology. Latour emphasizes this with the funny term actant, which 
he uses instead of “actor” to underscore the way that intentionality, 
humanness, even animateness is not necessary for participants in 
networks to have effects on the world.19 An intention may be 
interesting, but whether it is important will depend on the particular 
situation I analyze and the angle I view it from.20 Taking a tip from 
Foucault and Latour, when we find technologies making protestations 
of innocence—I’m just a simple means to someone else’s end!—we 
should ask what participants help articulate that position and what 
larger effects it might have.  
C. Representing, Intervening 
Finally, the work of Ian Hacking can help structure how we think 
about technology. Hacking is primarily interested in how it is that we 
know things and how we think about knowing. He suggests that, 
historically, people have thought about science in two broadly 
contrasting ways, which is nicely captured in the title of his book on 
this topic: Representing and Intervening.21 The “representing” view 
sees knowledge as a description: We know that we know something 
when we can explain it or discuss it. The “intervening” view, in 
contrast, places the proof in the pudding: In this view, knowledge is 
not so much the ability to describe as to affect. We know that we know 
 
 19. See LATOUR, supra note 17, at 201.  
 20. See Timothy Mitchell, Can the Mosquito Speak?, in RULE OF EXPERTS: 
EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 19, 23 (2002) (combining the approaches of 
Foucault and Latour to explore technological and political history).  
 21. See generally IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: 
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE (1983). Latour and 
Hacking have different ideas about how we should treat nonhuman actors. Basically, 
Hacking thinks human beings are more special than Latour does. See generally 
Hacking, supra note 15 (“What happens to tuberculosis bacilli depends on whether or 
not we poison them with BCG vaccine, but it does not depend upon how we describe 
them. . . . Human action is more closely linked to human description than bacterial 
action is. . . . The microbes’ possibilities are delimited by nature, not by words. What 
is curious about human action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing 
depends on the possibilities of description. . . . Hence if new modes of description 
come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence.”). This 
disagreement, while important, does not impinge on the way I draw on both scholars 
here. 
1252 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
something when we can make it happen, or change it, or stop it from 
happening.  
As Hacking explains, scientific study has both a “describe it” 
and an “affect it” side.22 But so do many other things. Linguists and 
anthropologists, for instance, have shown how language also has this 
quality. Traditional views of language treat it as a transparent tool for 
identifying and describing things that already exist in the world. In 
fact, though, these are just the most easily noticed things that language 
does. Language also profoundly alters the world it sounds in. 
Linguistic acts create and reconfigure social situations in ways that 
may be less obvious to conscious notice, but no less important for 
social life.23  
Relatedly, popular images of law present it as primarily 
intervening in, rather than describing, the world. The classic 
formulation, after all, presents law as a command from a sovereign to 
a subject.24 Yet behind any constraint or authorization that law might 
give lies an implicit understanding of the world that law acts on. The 
law can really only intervene insofar as it represents, even if that 
representation remains implicit. Knowing and doing, Hacking’s 
typology reminds us, are not really separable—they are two sides of 
one coin. Whatever technology we have for understanding legal 
language, then, will include implicit representations of law, language, 
and the world they inhabit. 
D. Conclusion: Evaluating Technologies of Legal Meaning 
I do not mean to say that technology “really is” one thing and 
not another. Technology is a large concept that can encompass many 
 
 22. See PETER GALLISON, IMAGE AND LOGIC: A MATERIAL CULTURE OF 
MICROPHYSICS 10–13 (1997) (writing about how representing and intervening are 
united in the practice of scientific research). 
 23. See, e.g., Paul Friedrich, Social Context and Semantic Feature: The 
Russian Pronominal Usage, in DIRECTIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY 
OF COMMUNICATION 270, 270 (John J. Gumperz & Dell Hymes eds., 1972) (showing 
how choices in pronouns can contribute to “dynamic relations” among speakers). See 
generally J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–7 (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, 
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16–19 (1974); Michael 
Silverstein, Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description, in MEANING IN 
ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 33–34 (Keith H. Basso & Henry A. Selby eds., 1976).  
 24. See Brian Bix, John Austin and Constructing Theories of Law, in THE 
LEGACY OF JOHN AUSTIN’S JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1 (Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus 
eds., 2013) (describing Austin’s view of the law as “essentially the command of a 
sovereign to its subjects”).  
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things; there probably is no one thing that it “really is.” But I do think 
that there are ways we ought to approach whatever it is, ways we ought 
to view it and evaluate it. In other words, I am not making a 
definitional claim but a methodological one. My contention is that the 
things we generally call technology—machines, computers, and so 
on—have something fundamental, something important, in common 
with “ways of doing things,” ways of controlling action and having 
social effects, more generally. This commonality implies that when 
we interrogate machine-based or computer-based ways of doing 
things, we should not assume that those ways of doing things are 
somehow qualitatively different from other ways of doing things. We 
should develop questions that allow us to capture both high-tech and 
low-tech ways of doing things, and to compare them to one another.  
In that sense, my claim is also a somewhat normative one: Rather 
than privileging mechanized or computerized ways of doing things, 
we should see them as belonging to the same category as other ways 
of doing things, and as subject to evaluation by the same standards. As 
a side note, I think this refusal to treat mechanistic technologies as 
special can also help us avoid some common pathologies, like the 
tendency to think that some result is better than no result, or that being 
able to get a result quickly through a mechanized or highly mediated 
process (like a mouse click) makes it valuable.  
The orientations discussed in this Part yield central questions to 
ask of any technology. How does the technology represent the things 
it acts on—that is, what presuppositions about the world does the 
technology build in? What participants or factors contribute to making 
it work, and what claims make sense of it? What paths does it lay for 
future endeavors? And, of course, what alternatives does it leave out? 
II. LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
In this Article, I want to apply this evaluative approach to the 
meaning-making technology of legal corpus linguistics. Legal corpus 
linguistics draws on approaches developed in the academic discipline 
of linguistics but tends to abandon some of their crucial aspects.25 I 
start at the source to describe corpus linguistics in the discipline of 
linguistics and then explain how that approach has changed in legal 
interpretation.  
 
 25. See Bernstein, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14–16) (discussing the 
relationship between academic corpus linguistics and its slightly different legal corpus 
cousin).  
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A. Academic Corpus Linguistics  
Academic corpus linguistics uncovers widely shared speech 
patterns. Researchers compile data sets (corpora) of language use. 
These data sets are often specified by particular genres, registers, 
speech participants, or other parameters, and populated with examples 
of utterances produced in the natural course of things—whatever the 
natural course of things is for that genre, register, speech participant, 
and so on.26 So, a study of newspaper language would collect articles 
to use as examples, a study of academic writing would collect 
academic works, and research on ordinary conversation would draw 
on recordings of spontaneous interactions. This approach contrasts 
with some ways of getting linguistic data that some other methods of 
linguistics have used, like asking speakers to evaluate the 
grammaticality of a formulation, or asking them how they would say 
certain things, or otherwise eliciting speakers’ own thoughts about or 
reactions to language use, as opposed to collecting examples of 
language use itself.27  
Rather than eliciting utterances or opinions for the purposes of 
research, then, corpus linguistics generally goes out to find utterances 
 
 26. There is some give in this requirement. For instance, researchers have 
asked subjects to narrate the events of a short movie in order to collect numerous 
narrative texts oriented around the same subject. See generally WALLACE L. CHAFE 
ED., THE PEAR STORIES: COGNITIVE, CULTURAL, AND LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF 
NARRATIVE PRODUCTION (1980). These narrations are produced for the corpus. But 
the researchers did not ask people to, for instance, evaluate the grammaticality of a 
particular phrasing or produce a grammatical formulation of some content, as non-
corpus elicitation studies might. Rather, they provided a topic and then let speakers 
narrate it freely in order to compile a corpus of different speakers’ narrations of the 
same focal object, which could be used to find commonalities and differences across 
social groups, linguistic backgrounds, and even languages, in order to draw 
comparative conclusions about language use. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: 
GRAMMATICALITY JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY xvi (2016) 
(“Throughout much of the history of linguistics, judgments of the 
grammaticality/acceptability of sentences (and other linguistic intuitions) have been 
the major source of evidence in constructing grammars.”). This kind of elicitation data 
can provide interesting insights, but it also has limitations that the corpus approach 
aims to overcome. For instance, people tend to be better at noticing some linguistic 
phenomena than others, so asking them for their ideas about language might reveal 
how people think about language, without revealing how they actually speak in 
practice. See generally Michael Silverstein, The Limits of Awareness, in LINGUISTIC 
ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 382 (Alessandro Duranti ed., 2001) (discussing aspects 
of language that fall outside speakers’ awareness and are therefore not susceptible to 
speaker judgments or descriptions).  
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in their natural habitats.28 Moreover, corpus linguists usually try to 
collect a broad range of sources for analysis, with the aim of 
uncovering patterns and practices that are fairly general and widely 
distributed within their target genre, register, population, and so on. 
And corpus linguists often use computational tools of varying 
complexity to undertake their investigations. The idea is to reveal 
regularities or connections that are invisible to the naked eye and to 
help linguists recognize patterns and practices that characterize our 
speech but are not noticeable in the ordinary course of things.29  
A few examples can give readers the flavor of corpus linguistic 
findings.30 Linguists have found that in everyday conversations, 
people generally do not maximize the amount of information they 
convey at a time. On the contrary, across languages, speakers tend to 
introduce new characters, concepts, and other objects of focus no more 
than once per clause.31 And when speakers do name new things in 
conversation, they usually introduce them first, and only then describe 
those things affecting their surroundings.32 So for instance, in an 
everyday conversation about shopping in a grocery store, I might say, 
“this couple came in and they got some ice cream,” separating out the 
introduction of the couple from the introduction of the ice cream, 
rather than, “a couple got ice cream” or “a couple who came in got ice 
cream,” even though all three are grammatical and convey the same 
information.33 One might have thought that people would want to be 
efficient and convey as much information as possible as quickly as 
they can. In practice, though, that is not how we actually speak.  
 
 28. See, e.g., Deborah Tannen, Discourse Analysis: What Speakers Do in 
Conversation, LINGUISTIC SOC’Y OF AM., https://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/ 
discourse-analysis-what-speakers-do-conversation [https://perma.cc/25BK-T3YS] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (stating that corpus linguistics is not the first nor the only 
methodology that uses such “naturally occurring” linguistic data; it is just a 
particularly prominent one). 
 29. See generally, e.g., Stefan Th. Gries, 50-Something Years of Work on 
Collocations: What Is or Should Be Next…, 18 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 137 
(2013) (discussing algorithms that may help map asymmetric collocation in corpora).  
 30. I discuss these examples in a bit more detail elsewhere. See generally 
Bernstein, supra note 1.  
 31. See John W. Du Bois, The Discourse Basis of Ergativity, 63 LANGUAGE 
805, 826 (1987). See generally Elise Kärkkäinen, Preferred Argument Structure and 
Subject Role in American English Conversational Discourse, 25 J. PRAGMATICS 675 
(1996).  
 32. See Kärkkäinen, supra note 31, at 675. That is, linguists have found that 
people tend to introduce new objects of focus first as either subjects of intransitive 
verbs or as objects of transitive verbs, not as subjects of transitive verbs.  
 33. See, e.g., Du Bois, supra note 31, at 824.  
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Corpus linguistics can also reveal differences between genres 
that are not obvious to the casual observer. For instance, both everyday 
American English conversations and formal American English 
academic writing use “lexical bundles” or stock phrases to “provide 
interpretive frames for the developing discourse,” setting the scene for 
further content.34 But conversation participants use entire formulaic 
clauses (involving a noun and a verb), inserting their own individual 
content before or after a standard word bundle.35 Academic writers, in 
contrast, use formulaic noun phrases, and insert individual content 
right inside a standard phrasal frame.36 Genre thus influences how 
people use even formulaic expressions like word bundles.  
Other people can influence us, too: In ordinary conversation, 
speakers often echo one another. We are so sensitive to the language 
around us that we often unwittingly structure our own speech to match 
that of our interlocutors. When one person uses a particular linguistic 
form, another conversation participant is likely to use that same form 
as well, even when other options are available—and even when the 
two are speaking different languages.37  
 
 34. See Douglas Biber, A Corpus-Driven Approach to Formulaic Language 
in English: Multi-Word Patterns in Speech and Writing, 14 INT’L J. CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS 275, 285 (2009). 
 35. See id. For instance, a speaker might use the full clause what do you think, 
inserting her own content before or after it: “what do you think about this ice cream” 
or “I’m not sure about this ice cream, what do you think?” See id. at 299 
(“Conversation prefers fixed continuous sequences of words, with a preceding or 
following variable slot.”). 
 36. For example, an academic article might use the formulaic noun phrase 
the … of the, inserting the specific noun as needed: “the end of the,” or “the case of 
the,” or “the fact of the,” and so on. See id. at 284. 
 37. Studies of structural priming recognize that there is often more than one 
way to convey the same information, so speakers have choices about what syntactic 
arrangements to use. For instance, I could say “I gave her the ice cream” or “I gave 
the ice cream to her” to describe the same act. Research has found that speakers are 
more likely to choose a syntactic formulation they have recently heard in their own 
subsequent speech. So, if in a naturally occurring conversation you say to me, “I gave 
my ticket to my brother,” then when it comes to telling you about giving someone ice 
cream, I am more likely to match your syntactic formulation—“I gave the ice cream 
to her”—rather than choose the other option—“I gave her the ice cream.” See Stefan 
Th. Gries & Gerrit Jan Kootstra, Structural Priming Within and Across Languages: A 
Corpus-Based Perspective, 20 BILINGUALISM: LANGUAGE & COGNITION 235, 235–36 
(2017) (describing demonstrations of structural priming, in which “speakers tend to 
re-use structures they have recently comprehended or produced themselves,” as 
“robust and widespread”). Structural priming works across languages, too: when 
conversation participants use two languages that offer some similar syntactic options, 
“hearing/producing a syntactic structure in one language will increase the probability 
of producing a related structure in another language.” See id. at 236; see also Melinda 
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Moreover, a speaker’s choice of one linguistic form can have 
social implications even when it does not explicitly affect the meaning 
of the utterance. In standard American English, for instance, a speaker 
sometimes has a choice about whether to use the word that.38 “He 
claims he called you” and “he claims that he called you” are both 
correct and both mean the same thing. Or so it seems. But linguists 
have discovered that people tend to use this “complementizer that” in 
several kinds of situations: when the information that follows it is 
syntactically complex, when the information content is surprising, and 
when speakers want to distance themselves from it.39 Thus, when I say 
“he claims that he called you,” I subtly—probably unconsciously—
imply that I lack total commitment to the proposition that he did, in 
fact, call you.40 Such implication through language pattern choice is 
called semantic prosody.  
In short, corpus linguistics gives researchers a way to track 
patterns in various genres of language usage. It illuminates how 
language users distribute their focus, control information flow, deploy 
aesthetic choices, create rapport, convey attitudes, and much more.41 
Speakers do these things, moreover, in ways that are neither 
formalized into rules, nor solidified as grammars, and not easily 
observable in individual instances of speech.42 Corpus linguistics, 
 
Fricke & Gerrit Jan Kootstra, Primed Codeswitching in Spontaneous Bilingual 
Dialogue, 91 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 181 (2016). 
 38. See Sandra A. Thompson & Anthony Mulac, The Discourse Conditions 
for the Use of the Complementizer That in Conversational English, 15 J. PRAGMATICS 
237, 249–50 (1991); see also T. Florian Jaeger, Redundancy and Reduction: Speakers 
Manage Syntactic Information Density, 61 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 23 (2010) (arguing that 
this pattern distributes information within discourse). 
 39. See Stefanie Wulff et al., Optional that in Complementation by German 
and Spanish Learners, in WHAT IS APPLIED COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS? ANSWERS FROM 
CURRENT SLA RESEARCH 99–101 (Andera Tyler et al. eds., 2018) (noting that 
complementizer “that” has been “intensively studied . . . . [o]ver the last 25 years”). 
 40. See JOHN SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT: LANGUAGE, CORPUS AND 
DISCOURSE 174 (John Sinclair & Ronald Carter eds., 2004) (defining “semantic 
prosody” as the aspect of an utterance that “express[es] attitudinal and pragmatic 
meaning”).  
 41. See ROMAN JAKOBSON, LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE 66–69 (Krystyna 
Pomorska & Stephen Rudy eds., 1987) (describing the emotive, conative, poetic, 
metalingual, and phatic functions of language).  
 42. See Du Bois, supra note 31, at 851 (“[R]egularities exist in speech which 
are not necessarily instantiations of any type in grammar; nor do the systematic 
patterns in what speakers say necessarily derive from rules of grammar that they 
know.”); Elizabeth O’Dowd, Discourse Pressure, Genre and Grammatical 
Alignment—After Du Bois, 14 STUD. LANGUAGE 365, 390–91 (1990) (arguing that 
genre affects the emergence of grammatical forms). 
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mobilizing large data sets for qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
sheds light on these hidden patterns.  
B. Legal Corpus Linguistics 
In recent years, legal scholars and practitioners have drawn on 
corpus linguistics for legal interpretation. Corpus inquiries have 
appeared in articles, amicus briefs, and even judicial opinions.43 This 
legal corpus linguistics has diverged from academic corpus linguistics 
in some important ways.44 For one thing, legal corpus linguistics has 
generally taken a narrower focus than many academic corpus 
linguistic analyses. Rather than tracking information distribution 
within discourse or syntactic patterning across genres, legal corpus 
linguistics tends to focus on specific words, usually just one or a few 
words at a time. It usually asks how often a word appears in a corpus, 
or how often it appears alongside some other isolated word. 
For an easily recognizable example, consider Muscarello v. 
United States.45 In these consolidated cases, one person had a gun 
locked in the glove compartment of his car while he engaged in a drug 
deal; another had a gun in his trunk. Did these people “carr[y] a 
firearm” during a drug transaction, thus triggering a statute’s enhanced 
punishment?46 To see whether ordinary people would describe a 
person who has a gun in the locked glove compartment or trunk of his 
car as “carr[ying] a firearm,” we could look to a large corpus of 
American English to see whether the word “carry,” or the phrase 
“carry a firearm,” often co-occurs with words having to do with cars. 
If, in contrast, “carry” or “carry a firearm” usually appears with words 
having to do with individual humans, then that might indicate that it is 
ordinarily used in the sense of “to carry [something] on one’s person” 
as opposed to “to carry [something] in a vehicle.”47  
 
 43. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing legal corpus linguistic research on the meaning of 
“search” at the time of the founding); American Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union 
Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 57–58, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2018); Wilson v. Safelite Group, 
Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016); State v. 
Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275, 1277 (Utah 2015); State v. Canton, 308 P.3d 517, 
520–21 (Utah 2013).  
 44. See generally Bernstein, supra note 1. 
 45. 524 U.S. 125, 127–31 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 126–27. 
 47. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1926. Muscarello is a favorite for legal 
corpus linguistic discussion because Justice Breyer, who wrote the majority opinion, 
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Legal corpus studies also often use a “key word in context” 
(KWIC) search, which examines the immediate context in which 
target terms appear in the corpus. Thus, for Muscarello, one could look 
at the paragraph level to see how phrases like “carry a firearm” are 
deployed to give a larger chunk of text meaning in the corpus. If, for 
instance, we find many instances where having a gun in a glove 
compartment or a trunk is contrasted with having a gun at the ready 
on one’s person, we can hypothesize that the glove compartment and 
trunk situations might not ordinarily constitute “carrying a firearm”—
at least for the kinds of utterance situations captured in the corpus.  
While many academic linguists construct their own corpus or 
use specific corpora particularly suitable for their inquiry, legal corpus 
analysts have generally used publicly available corpora compiled by 
others. Particular favorites have been corpora from the legal corpus 
linguistics project at Brigham Young University, whose law school 
has been a leading force in promoting the method: the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), the News on the Web 
Corpus (NOW), the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), 
and the Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).48 The 
COCA collects American materials from “spoken, fiction, popular 
magazines, newspapers, academic texts,” and, since March 2020, also 
“TV and Movies subtitles, blogs, and other web pages.”49 The NOW 
corpus collects material “from web-based newspapers and magazines 
from 2010 to the present time,” continuously crawling the English-
language Internet—essentially covering diverse descendants of the 
 
engaged in something that looked a bit like a low-tech corpus inquiry. See Muscarello, 
524 U.S. at 126, 129 (noting that the Court had “surveyed modern press usage . . . by 
searching computerized newspaper data bases” and selecting from “thousands of 
sentences in which ‘the words “carry,” “vehicle,” and “weapon” (or variations 
thereof) all appear”). As scholars have noted, this way of conducting the search 
prejudges the question of whether “carry” generally appears with “vehicle” by setting 
that co-appearance as a search parameter. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1947 
(calling the Muscarello majority’s inquiry “fatally flawed”); Anya Bernstein, 
Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435, 450 (2018) (“This is a 
bit like asking whether most deaths are caused by terrorist attacks, then counting 
terrorist attacks rather than deaths. Since ‘carry’ appears in more utterances than 
‘carry’ and ‘vehicle’ together do, searching only within the combination cannot tell 
us how ‘carry’ itself is ordinarily used.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), ENG. 
CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca [https://perma.cc/ZES7-KM76] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
 49. See id.  
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British Empire—for new material.50 The COHA contains American 
texts from fiction and nonfiction books, magazines, and newspapers 
from the 1810s through the 2000s.51 And the COFEA has sources 
“starting with the reign of King George III, and ending with the death 
of George Washington (1760-1799),” including “documents from 
ordinary people of the day, the Founders, and legal sources, including 
letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction books, fiction, sermons, 
speeches, debates, legal cases, and other legal materials,” including 
“the U.S. Statutes-at-Large from the first five Congresses.”52 The 
documentation for each corpus boasts about the sheer number of 
words, often numbering in the billions, that they collect. But it does 
not always fully explore the methodological effects of their word-
collection practices.  
For instance, the COFEA contains what its documentation calls 
“documents from ordinary people of the day,” but does not detail who 
counts as ordinary people for its purposes, nor explain what its 
collection might reveal about ordinary usage. Given that colonial 
people were sharply differentiated in their opportunities to produce 
and preserve documents, those questions matter—especially if one is 
using these documents to evaluate how contemporaneous speakers 
used terms that appeared in statutes. To give a stark example, slave-
owning White people and enslaved Black people were both “ordinary 
people of the day.” In fact, there were probably more slaves than slave 
owners. So if one is concerned with statistical frequency, as legal 
corpus writers tend to be, it is enslaved speech that should probably 
be considered the more ordinary. But a historical corpus cannot 
capture that ordinary speech because the resource and power 
disparities of our slave society meant that slave-owners were much 
more likely to produce and preserve documents than slaves were.  
Treating these documents as representative of a generically 
ordinary people thus normalizes, and obscures, the power of the 
powerful. If the language of ordinary people is used as a guide to 
 
 50. See News on the Web (NOW) Corpus, ENG. CORPORA, 
https://www.english-corpora.org/now/ [https://perma.cc/2EZ3-3KDH] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2021). 
 51. See Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), ENG. CORPORA, 
https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/ZFJ3-ZFUY] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2021). 
 52. See Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU LAW, 
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/P586-7C2E] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) 
(describing each of several corpora developed or under development by the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School at Brigham Young University). 
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interpret what laws mean, moreover, this approach gives those with 
more text-producing and text-preserving ability a higher claim to 
determining the meanings of laws. Such disparities may be 
unavoidable—we cannot go back and record the speech of people long 
dead who lacked the means to preserve their utterances in writing. 
There may even be arguments for preferring the speech of slave-
owners, if for instance we want a corpus that approximates the 
language of the lawmakers rather than the language of those subject 
to the laws but left out of their production. And in any event, such 
limitations certainly do not make the corpus useless. But they do make 
a phrase like “ordinary people of the day” inadequate to describe what 
it is the corpus offers those interested in evaluating what legal terms 
meant to a broad swath of American residents.  
In the area of contemporary language, the COCA collects both 
written and spoken genres, with spoken texts drawn “Transcripts of 
unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and radio 
programs (examples: All Things Considered (NPR), Newshour (PBS), 
Good Morning America (ABC), Oprah).”53 The COCA’s 
documentation claims that these texts are representative of ordinary, 
naturally occurring conversations because, like ordinary conversation, 
they are “unscripted.”54 But there are obvious differences between 
naturally occurring conversations and those on radio or TV, even if 
they are not scripted. Radio and TV shows are hosted by hosts who 
invite guests on for particular reasons, to cover a very limited range of 
topics in a very limited time frame, and with little opportunity to draw 
on shared personal experience or create frames of mutual reference. 
Most ordinary conversations are not like that. In real life, it is quite 
common to sit around dinner tables or water coolers talking about this 
and that, not displaying any particular expertise, and referring to 
people we know in common or experiences we have shared. Even a 
relatively purpose-driven and time-limited interaction like a checkout 
counter conversation might include lots of nonpurposeful small talk. 
The pragmatics of these utterances—the circumstances that surround 
them—differ, and pragmatics are an important determinant of how 
people speak and what they say. Again, these limitations do not make 
the COCA’s spoken word sections useless. But it does mean that what 
they offer to someone interested in how ordinary people speak is 
 
 53. See The COCA Corpus, BYU, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ 
help/coca2020_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5EF-9ZPX] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021). 
 54. See id.  
1262 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
limited in particular ways that a researcher must recognize in order to 
use the material in a way that makes sense.  
C. Using a Corpus 
It may be useful to describe in a bit more detail how a corpus 
search might go. I take as my example here the COCA, a favorite 
among legal corpus users, and follow one path one might tread to 
consider the “carry[] a firearm” language in Muscarello.55 The 
example here is stylized in the sense that one would expect a person 
actually doing corpus-based research to pursue more leads and 
experiment with more alternatives. But it can serve to introduce 
readers to the basic idea, and the basic layout, in play.56 
The COCA user interface is pleasingly simple.57 The right-hand 
side of the screen contains a link to a discussion of new features, an 
offer to download the corpus, and a very brief introduction to the 
corpus with embedded links to further information. The top banner 
bears a few graphically depicted options: an introduction to the corpus, 
more details on its contents, a way to compare it to others, an option 
to download, an option to input a long text for analysis, and an 
opportunity to log in with an individual account to view corpora 
excerpts and searches associated with that account. Below these 
pictures are four simple options: search, frequency, context, download 
data. The frequency and context options depend on the search one 
does; download data produces the same screen as the download option 
on the top banner.  
The star of the show is the search option, which displays on the 
left side of the screen when one accesses the COCA. It includes a 
search box into which one can type things for which to search the 
corpus. Above the search box sits an expandable list with several 
features: list, chart, word, browse, collocates, compare, KWIC. Each 
of these shows the target search terms in particular ways. “List” shows 
all occurrences in the corpus, while “chart” displays the frequency of 
occurrence by genre. The “word” option shows a kind of homepage 
for individual words, displaying pronunciation, dictionary definition, 
synonyms, common collocates, topical areas, common phrases in 
 
 55. See generally Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 56. See Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), supra note 48. 
A reader viewing this Article in a format that does not include figures can go to the 
COCA website and follow the path I lay out here. Note, however, that the COCA is 
regularly updated with more entries, such that the results returned will vary over time. 
 57. See id.; infra Figure 1. 
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which the term appears, and an initial list of the term in sentence 
context. “Browse” allows a search by sound, part of speech, and other 
non-lexical targets. “Collocates” returns to lexical targets, displaying 
the terms that appear alongside the target term, while “compare” 
allows one to see simultaneously the collocates of two separate terms 
(and where they overlap). Finally, “KWIC” yields “key words in 
context,” that is, the words that immediately surround the target term. 
Figure 1. 
 
If I wanted to investigate how the phrase “carry a firearm” 
appears in the corpus, I would type that phrase into the search field on 
the left side. To account for different grammatical forms of the base 
term “carry,” like “carrying, carried,” and so on, I could type an 
asterisk, like so: “carr* a firearm.”58 
 
 58. See infra Figure 2. 




The COCA returns four possibilities, listed in order of frequency of 
appearance: “carrying a firearm” (37 instances); “carry a firearm” 













 59. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. 
 
I can then choose one of these results for an expanded view of 
the instances of that form. For instance, if I click on “carry a firearm,” 
the screen shows a scrollable table with numbered instances. Columns 
include entry number; year of appearance (by default in reverse 
chronological order); the COCA genre category from which the 
occurrence was drawn (such as spoken, news, academic, fiction, and 
magazine); and the specific source from which it came (like the title 
of a TV show, newspaper, book, website, etc.). There are then three 
columns, labeled A, B, and C, to help researchers order and keep track 
of the occurrences. Finally, each row displays a long cell that shows 
the immediate context of the target word, which is highlighted. In this 
particular search, for instance, the first context cell, drawn from the 
CBS show Face the Nation, says: “crazy notion of arming teachers, 
teachers are going to quit before they carry a firearm in class. I—”; 
while the second, from the Minneapolis Star Tribune, says: “suspects 
before they are charged. # The man has a permit to carry a firearm and 









 60. See infra Figure 4. The # sign indicates a paragraph break; text excerpts 
in this cell commonly cut off in the middle of a word, since the cell is a standard size. 
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Figure 4. 
 
I can further home in on any of these occurrences for a larger 
contextual frame. For instance, when I click on number nine in the list, 
I get a different screen. A table toward the top contains some basic 
information about where the occurrence of “carry a firearm” was 
found, again in a simple table form. Here I see the Date (2016), Title 
(Twisted Innocence), Author (Terri Blackstock), and Source (FIC: 
Twisted Innocence).61 Then, in a paragraph marked Expanded context, 
I see a slightly longer excerpt with the target phrase underlined and 
highlighted. For this particular entry, the excerpt reads as follows:  
girlfriend, just to create trouble in paradise. She and her friends would 
giggle hysterically at the fight they imagined ensued, but the next day, as 
she nursed the punishment of a hangover, she would hate herself for it. # 
Not ready to give up on this fare just yet, Holly honked the horn again. The 
men up the street turned to look at her. Getting nervous, she reached into 
the pocket of her door, but of course her pistol wasn’t there. It was against 
the law for a cabbie to carry a firearm inside the car while they were on 
 
 61. If I had clicked on a newspaper article, the Title row would show the title 
of the article, while the Source row would show the name of the newspaper. 
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duty. It was locked safely in her trunk. # She thought of bucking the law 
and getting it out, but that would call more attention to her. This was stupid. 
She was a mother now, and the last place she should have been was in the 
slums, waiting for someone to blow her head off just for target practice. # 
But what if the woman who’d called wasn’t a kid at all, but someone 




Note that this rather tantalizing excerpt seems to give some 
support to both sides in Muscarello. In this passage, being “locked 
safely in [a] trunk” distinguishes Holly’s firearm from one that is 
“carr[ied],” which suggests that “carry a firearm” would not describe 
a gun in the trunk. But the law referred to in this work of fiction 
specifies that cabbies may not carry firearms “inside the car,” which 
suggests that a firearm in a locked glove compartment might still be 
“carried” if the law failed to specify a location, as the statute at issue 
in Muscarello did.  
This one example nicely illustrates the inherently qualitative 
assessment that goes into determining how a given term is used in a 
particular context and hypothesizing about what that might imply. In 
other words, even using corpus data, a lot of judgment and conjecture 
goes into any conclusion about ordinary usage. But my point here is 
not to determine what “carry a firearm” means when used by ordinary 
 
 62. See infra Figure 5. 
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people. Rather, I simply want to provide readers with an on-the-
ground understanding of how one might actually search for terms or 
phrases in the COCA and its sibling corpora.  
Having conducted this search, I would need to figure out what 
the results tell me. I might look through all of the results and come up 
with ways to classify them that seem to capture some relevant 
distinctions and similarities within my results, or I might apply a 
classification system I have already developed through other research, 
or I might borrow a classification system developed in the voluminous 
research literature that seeks to uncover how languages tend to 
categorize things, or perhaps I would simply use my own intuition 
about how our language cuts up the world as a basis for creating 
categories into which to group my results. I could also do more 
searches to see, for instance, how often forms of “carry” appear with 
words other than firearms, how often versions of “firearm” appear 
with words other than “carry,” how often either one appears with 
words having to do with vehicles versus persons, and so on.63 
Such questions about frequency and co-occurrence, which have 
typified legal corpus inquiry, could not, of course, yield the kind of 
insight into hidden language patterns that academic corpus linguistics 
has revealed. Legal corpus searches do not track how words appear or 
interact over longer texts or numerous conversational turns, and they 
generally have not recognized genre distinctions. So this kind of 
search would not yield the kinds of insights into discursive structure, 
semantic prosody, or genre-specific usage discussed in Section II.A.  
A simple frequency and collocation search also provides a fairly 
limited amount of information since words can appear or coappear 
more or less frequently for many different reasons that are not 
themselves obvious from the search. Words may appear together 
frequently because the things they describe occur together often, but 
they might also appear together frequently because the things they 
describe do not occur together often since nonstandard or unexpected 
occurrences may be more likely to be remarked on, or marked.64 
Words may appear together because they fit into a shared category 
(tokens of the same type); or because one constitutes a superordinate 
category for the other (a type with a token); or because they form a 
 
 63. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1965–66 (discussing the results of a 
corpus analysis of the phrase at issue in Muscarello). 
 64. See Ethan J. Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties 
in Operationalizing Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 112, 114 (2017); Biber, supra note 34, at 280 (“The role of frequency and 
quantitative analysis in corpus- driven research is . . . controversial.”). 
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salient contrast of different categories (two different types, two tokens 
of different types, or a type with a token of a different type). Or they 
may appear together infrequently or not at all, yet still possess these 
kinds of relationships.65 
Such sociological vagaries pervade language use. One might 
even say they constitute language use.66 But legal corpus studies 
generally cannot account for them. Indeed, the field has been notable 
for the narrowness with which its writers have approached their topic. 
Legal corpus writing rarely refers to the extensive research in 
linguistics that illuminates the social construction of language use, nor 
to works addressing how to construct and analyze corpus searches.67 
Thus, legal corpus users often borrow a very small part of corpus 
linguistics’ method—the part with a search bar—without fitting it into 
the overarching methodology or the theoretical developments that 
make sense of it.  
Legal corpus writers also tend to be narrow linguistically. They 
have been almost uniformly uninterested in the kinds of broad patterns 
that linguists study, such as how people manage information flow, 
create joint attention on discursive objects, or implicate attitudes in 
seemingly neutral statements. Instead, legal corpus writers have 
usually focused on individual words or, at the most, small lexical 
bundles of three or four words, divorced from bigger discursive 
contexts such as statutory provisions, sets of provisions in one statute, 
related provisions across several statutes, Congressional records 
indicating the range of meanings the words were expected to have by 
those who made them law, and so on. And within the realm of one-to-
four word units, legal corpus writers have been narrowly focused on a 
very limited range of phenomena, primarily frequency and 
 
 65. See Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool 
in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1313–16 (2017) (noting that the 
absence of some token from a corpus does not indicate that it is not in fact a token of 
some type—an issue the authors call the “blue pitta problem” after the blue pitta, a 
rare bird whose name does not appear in the COCA, but which is nonetheless a bird).  
 66. John W. Du Bois, Grammar, 9 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 92, 93 
(1999) (“Pattern derives from practice. . . . [and] grammar [is] patterned speaking.”). 
 67. A recent article provides a striking example, laying out a roadmap for 
legal researchers using corpus linguistics methods. See generally James C. Phillips & 
Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and 
Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus 
Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589 (2017). Phillips and Egbert give a 
thorough, readable introduction to basic professional responsibility in this area. By 
outlining the minimum standards that a reliable corpus analysis must fulfill they also 
show how dramatically most legal work deviates from such standards. 
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collocation. They have not attended to, for instance, the way words 
can appear or function differently across different genres or language 
use situations.  
At the same time, legal corpus writing has also been notable for 
its insistence that the corpus provides an indisputably correct answer 
about which meaning is really ordinary. This insistence has been 
particularly amusing when writers have used the same corpus, and 
sometimes even the same queries, to reach conflicting conclusions 
about legal meanings.68 Of course, it is not unusual for researchers in 
empirical fields to propose different interpretations of similar data, 
especially when the object of analysis is human behavior, which can 
indeed have similar manifestations for different reasons.69 Yet legal 
corpus writers tend to minimize the possibility of rational 
disagreement, sometimes claiming that the corpus provides clear, 
single, correct answers even in the face of manifest disagreement 
about the implications and causes of corpus results.70  
In other words, legal corpus work has stood out for its 
unwillingness to acknowledge the validity of disagreements that most 
empirical study finds pretty routine. Instead, it has borrowed the 
conventions of zealous advocacy from legal practice. That insistence 
indicates that legal corpus work wears an empirical mantle that does 
not quite fit, refashioning it to conform to the practices and habits of 
mind that characterize legal representation more than linguistic 
analysis.  
 
 68. Compare, e.g., People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Mich. 2016) 
(concluding on the basis of a corpus search that “[e]mpirical data . . . demonstrates . . 
. [that i]n common usage, [the word] ‘information’ is regularly used in conjunction 
with adjectives suggesting it may be both true and false”), with id. at 850 (Markman, 
J., dissenting) (concluding on the basis of the same corpus search that the word 
“information” is presumptively true unless marked otherwise). See generally Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, More on Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/09/more-on-
corpus-linguistics-and-the-criminal-law.html [https://perma.cc/G8VX-TM3E] 
(discussing this case).  
 69. See generally Anya Bernstein, The Songs of Other Birds, in INSIDERS, 
OUTSIDERS, INJURIES, AND LAW: REVISITING THE OVEN BIRD’S SONG 219 (Mary Nell 
Trautner ed. 2018) (discussing the way that similar sociological phenomena can have 
different meanings depending on their cultural surroundings).  
 70. See, e.g., Wilson v. Safelite Grp., 930 F.3d 429, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(Stranch, J., concurring) (expressing “concern with the implicit suggestion that corpus 
linguistics is a simple, objective tool capable of providing answers to the puzzle of 
statutory interpretation” and concluding that “[t]he use of corpus linguistics brings us 
no closer to an objective method of statutory interpretation”).  
 Technologies of Language Meet Ideologies of Law 1271 
III. LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS AS A TECHNOLOGY OF LEGAL 
MEANING 
Legal corpus linguistics nicely fits some commonplace 
understandings of technology: It produces results through the 
mediation of a computer, and it does so in a way that is invisible to the 
casual user. To use a corpus prepopulated with search functions like 
the COCA, one need not know anything about the process through 
which it yields results, or the theories and methods it rests on, or the 
alternatives to it that are available. One simply types a snippet into a 
search bar and presses return. Poof! That certainly feels like 
technology.  
Legal corpus linguistics also constitutes a technology under the 
more expansive and practice-oriented notion of technology that I laid 
out in Part I. It situates legal language in larger linguistic contexts as 
a way to attribute meaning to them—to say what the language of the 
law means to ordinary people and what we should therefore interpret 
it to mean for legal purposes. Note that this process is a bit different 
from the way the technology works in the academic context. Building 
on academic work, for instance, users might track how the optional 
complementizer “that” works in legal texts and whether it shows a 
similar or a different patterning to that of informal conversations. 
Looking for aesthetic composition—what in linguistics is sometimes 
called “poetics”—they could look for patterns of alliteration or vowel 
alternation that surround target terms. Investigating genre distinctions, 
they could track differences in the syntax of statutes and of other 
formal writing like academic articles or mathematical proofs. The 
corpus approach provides a broad range of possibilities for inquiry.  
Within that broad range, legal corpus linguistics focuses on a 
very particular kind of work, which differs from that of academic 
linguistics. It uses the counting and contextualizing functions of its 
preferred corpora not just to analyze patterns and distinctions in 
people’s use of language as a communicative medium, but to provide 
arguments about the meanings we ought to attribute to legal 
language.71 Legal corpus linguistics is a meaning-making machine. 
 
 71. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814, 818 (1987) (“Unlike literary or philosophical 
hermeneutics, the practice of interpretation of legal texts is theoretically not an end in 
itself. It is instead directly aimed at a practical object and is designed to determine 
practical effects. . . . Reading is one way of appropriating the symbolic power which 
is potentially contained within the text. Thus, as with religious, philosophical, or 
literary texts, control of the legal text is the prize to be won in interpretive struggles.”). 
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On this understanding of technology, moreover, the world of law 
is replete with technologies of interpretation; there are many machines 
for producing meaning. We have multiple normative theories that tell 
people how they ought to interpret legal language, such as textualism, 
purposivism, originalism, intentionalism, and so on. We also have 
multiple institutional sites where legal interpretation happens: courts, 
agencies, prosecutors’ offices, police departments, legal journals, and 
so on. And we have a range of practices that convert legal text into 
something that has social force—from reading to talking to 
prosecuting to rulemaking to researching and beyond.  
This multiplicity is, in a sense, implicit in the whole idea of legal 
language, which does many things at once. It describes a situation in 
the world to which it applies, thereby making explicit or implicit 
claims about realities outside the legal process. That is, it represents 
the world. It affects that situation by creating authority, constraint, 
enforceable conditions, or conclusions about the law itself. That is, it 
intervenes in the world it describes. In doing so, legal language 
changes the circumstances of the participants involved, putting them 
on a different footing than they were before the language was 
expressed in its legally cognizable form.72 Legal language also often 
exerts its power over long-ish periods of time, purporting to constrain 
not just today’s actions but tomorrow’s, and even the conduct of 
people not yet born in circumstances not yet imaginable. Just from 
those factors—the fact that legal language represents and intervenes 
in society in a temporally expansive way—a Latourian perspective 
would predict that legal meaning will require ongoing maintenance 
and concern. Because legal language has such an important role in 
representing and intervening in society, we should expect that 
consensus on its meaning will have to be constructed again and again, 
and again and again will fall apart.73  
 
See generally Bernstein, supra note 1 (arguing that while academic corpus linguistics 
is primarily an empirical exercise, legal corpus linguistics fundamentally rests on a 
normative claim). 
 72. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 128 (1981) (“A change in footing 
implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as 
expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance. A change 
in footing is another way of talking about a change in our frame for events.”).  
 73. See Latour, supra note 18, at 246 (“Archimedes spoke for a whole 
tradition when he exclaimed: ‘Give me one fixed point and I will move the Earth,’ but 
am I not speaking for another, much less prestigious but maybe as respectable 
tradition, if I exclaim in turn ‘Give me one matter of concern and I will show you the 
whole earth and heavens that have to be gathered to hold it firmly in place’? . . . The 
critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles.”).  
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The American judicial system, with its common-law style of 
development, reflects this fact. Every time a judicial opinion decides, 
with finality, the meaning of some legal language, that judicial opinion 
itself becomes available for interpretation in some future case. Legal 
language thus experiences moments of seeming closure while 
remaining continually available for ongoing reinterpretation. This 
reinterpretation occurs episodically and sporadically as cases get 
litigated. With its occasional moments of declared finality always 
subject to reinterpretation in future moments that yield new and 
different finalities, the system creates a feeling of stability within a 
structure of ongoing change. By couching new interpretations in the 
language of exposition or explication, judicial opinions can continue 
to claim that previous interpretations were final while changing them 
over successive cases.74 And because in the common law system each 
 
 74. Recent developments in the interpretation of pleading standards the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a nice example of how the language of 
explication can be used to introduce new interpretations. Rule 8 states that a viable 
complaint in civil litigation must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). The rule says 
nothing about how, if at all, a plaintiff must present the factual scenario that allegedly 
harmed her; she is merely instructed to make a claim. What does it take to show that 
she “is entitled to relief”? For decades, the governing interpretation of that 
requirement emphasized that the Rules did not require a plaintiff to “set out in detail 
the facts upon which he bases his claim.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957). Rather, a plaintiff need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” and the court should accept that claim 
as viable unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See id. at 45–46, 47. In 2007, 
the Supreme Court reinterpreted Rule 8. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 554 (2007). Twombly, however, did not purport to overrule Conley. Rather, 
it reinterpreted what Conley accomplished: “Conley . . . described the breadth of 
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard 
of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.” Id. at 563. Holding for the 
first time that pleadings relying on “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action will not do,” Twombly introduced a new interpretation of Rule 8. Id. at 555. 
But in rejecting the traditional interpretation of Rule 8, Twombly presented itself not 
as making a new rule but as merely explaining what Conley was really about. Twombly 
asserted that, despite how everyone had treated it for fifty years, Conley did not set 
out a pleading standard at all; it merely gave “an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard” that the Twombly court simply presented. See id. at 563. 
Two years later, the Court cemented this new approach, using Twombly as the primary 
interpretation of Rule 8. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“As the 
Court held in Twombly, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” (internal citation omitted)); Anne E. Ralph, Not 
the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome the 
Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 1 (“The Twombly and Iqbal 
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precedential judicial opinion itself becomes law—and because the part 
that becomes precedential is not just the result but the reasoning, with 
its analogies, offhand remarks, and thought experiments—the legal 
text to be interpreted grows over the history of litigation, providing 
each successive court with more material to work with and to mold 
into new legal meanings.75  
The common-law style thus provides a system for sporadically 
reinterpreting already interpreted language through litigation, with no 
end in sight. A litigant controversy involving a legal text spurs legal 
interpretation1, which presents itself as final, functioning as a kind of 
stop sign. But like a stop sign, this interpretation creates finality only 
for a time. A new litigant controversy can put the original legal text 
and its first legal interpretation—now inscribed into law—into motion 
again, yielding legal interpretation2, which again presents itself as 














cases drastically changed the pleading standard for lawsuits governed by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .” (internal references omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678)).  
 75. See Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 596 
(2017) (“Situating statutory text against the background of the corpus juris . . . does 
not necessarily constrain interpretation or make it predictable. . . . Picking and 
choosing within the vast legal realm, opinions present their claims about relevance as 
facts, rather than as arguments.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).  
 76. See infra Figure 6. This system instantiates the semiotic process in 
general, as theorized by the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce 
argued that meaning-making involves a sign that refers to a referent and is understood 
through an interpretant, which then itself becomes a sign for interpretation in 
subsequent moments of semiosis. See generally RICHARD J. PARMENTIER, SIGNS AND 
SOCIETY: FURTHER STUDIES IN SEMIOTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 3–4 (1994) (introducing 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s Semiotic Theory); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of 
Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004) (applying semiotic analysis to 
trademark law’s dilution doctrine).  
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Figure 6. 
 
At the same time, one of American law’s central claims to 
legitimacy is to provide certainty and predictability for those subject 
to it. This claim, of course, runs headlong into the actual common-law 
style of ongoing change through which that very predictability is 
supposed to be solidified. Technologies of legal interpretation become 
crucial to maintaining, or contesting, shared visions of how to give the 
law meaning and stability within a flexible, changing regime.77 It is 
thus also not surprising that they can become a focus of political 
contestation. 
A. Language in Legal Corpus Linguistics 
Like any technology, the legal corpus linguistic method for 
giving meaning to legal text rests on underlying assumptions about 
how legal texts come to mean things. This observation in itself is no 
criticism. Some built-in assumptions underlie any technology and 
indeed any action. A lever builds on understandings of gravity and 
mass, even if the person building the lever cannot explain or even 
name the concepts of gravity or mass. A technology’s underlying or 
 
 77. As I discuss further in Part IV, American law is also stabilized and 
changed through administrative, and not just through judicial, interpretation. See infra 
Part IV. Administrative decisions do not become quite the legal texts that judicial ones 
do, but administrative procedures, like judicial ones, provide a means to interpret legal 
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built-in understandings help determine how the technology functions 
in important ways. Knowing what assumptions a technology rests on 
gives us a clearer idea of what it does and how it works. As a 
technology of legal language, legal corpus work builds on 
understandings of both language and law.  
What image of language does legal corpus work present?78 Think 
back to the COCA interface, which resembles the interfaces of other 
BYU corpora favored by legal corpus linguistic studies. It presents a 
simple, rather uncluttered screen. The search area in particular is quite 
spare, with a lot of white space. From a Latourian perspective, the 
search screen itself a kind of actant, a participant with effects that is 
mobilized in the production and use of this technology.79 It makes 
possible the participation of other actants—we who search the corpus 
for clues about language.  
This interface embeds a crucial implication about linguistic 
meaning: that finding it is generally pretty simple. You just need a 
word and an Internet connection. In this sense, it is very inviting, 
soothing, and even allows a broadly democratic participation in the 
investigation of meaning. The BYU corpora, in particular, are free to 
use. They require no computational skills since the key search 
functions are already programmed in, available at the click of an on-
screen box. A user thus never has to—nor has the opportunity to—
construct a bespoke means of searching. These corpora also require no 
linguistics training. They come pre-coded for parts of speech and other 
characteristics. A user need not—and cannot—define or modify the 
parameters available for search. The overall message is that you do 
not need a lot of methodological preparation or theoretical 
sophistication; anyone can plug in a search term and get instant results.  
This implication of popular availability is true: Anyone can 
indeed plug in a search term and get results. But the impression that 
availability suffices to draw conclusions about legal language use 
belies the complexities underlying corpus use. The search box does 
not require or encourage users to recognize, much less make, the 
methodological decisions that go into delineating a corpus or 
determining whether it is relevant to a particular inquiry. It gives no 
 
 78. As with the rest of my critique, I address the technology employed by the 
legal corpus linguistics literature, which has departed significantly from work done in 
academic corpus linguistics. 
 79. Showing how seriously he takes the idea of actants, Latour once gave a 
speaking part to a train—and a train that was never even built, at that. See BRUNO 
LATOUR, ARAMIS OR THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY 55–56 (Catherine Porter trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1996).  
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hint of the need to determine what it is that a given search can reveal 
and where its limits lie. Indeed, to the untrained user, it may suggest 
that the key to determining linguistic meaning is running a search—a 
process that the program has automated—rather than interpreting 
search results, a qualitative process requiring judgment that is itself 
informed by understandings gleaned from a century of research and 
theory in linguistics and related disciplines.  
The commitment to simplicity visually implied by the search 
screen resonates in the ways that legal corpus work has generally 
proceeded. For instance, this literature generally stays focused on 
individual words or short phrases themselves, rather than asking how 
these words and short phrases contribute to ongoing meaning-making 
practices, cohere texts, or create relationships among texts or speech 
participants. Further, it treats individual words and short phrases as 
defined and modified through their interactions with their most 
immediate linguistic surroundings. Recall the results I got when I 
queried the COCA about carrying a firearm: a series of short snippets, 
each a sentence or so, showing the phrase in its immediate semantic 
context. I then had the option of choosing any one of these short 
snippets to get a slightly longer snippet—a paragraph or so—from the 
source text. For a legal corpus inquiry focused on finding the ordinary 
meaning of a particular word, the implication is that this meaning is 
primarily created through a series of such snippets, unconnected from 
one another and excerpted from their source text. Thus, a legal corpus 
inquiry might follow the phrase “carry a firearm” to all the corners of 
the corpus, asking a binary question about whether carrying is done 
by a person or a vehicle.80  
The technique here implies that words already contain meanings, 
which they carry with them into various contexts. The contexts used 
to specify and examine those preexisting meanings, moreover, are 
small-scale relationships with immediately surrounding texts—what 
in linguistics is called the syntagmatic relationship of one word to 
those that appear around it. So, for instance, each word in the utterance 
“I have read that book” stands in a syntagmatic relationship to the 
others. The different role each word plays in the sentence, as defined 
by a given language’s conventional sentence structures and 
grammatical markings, helps audiences give it meaning. Although the 
word “read” is pronounced the same as the word “red,” its syntagmatic 
placement—as part of a verb phrase with the verb “have” rather than 
a noun phrase with the noun “book”—would help a hearer 
 
 80. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1925–26.  
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disambiguate the homonyms. Similarly, prosody and syntax help an 
audience member understand whether the word “that” acts as a deictic 
pointing to a particular instance of the direct object “book,” or if it 
instead introduces a further clause with “book” as the topic, as in “I 
have read that book learning is worthless.” Syntagms yield meaning 
by relating the sentence placement, morphology, and utterance role of 
words that appear in an utterance. 
Meanwhile, paradigm sets help give words meaning by 
contrasting other words with similar utterance roles—words that 
could have appeared in the same place, but did not. So, for instance, 
the direct object “book” in my example utterance is in a paradigm set 
with words like “article,” “novel,” “music score,” and other things that 
can be read. Similarly, the verb “read” is to some extent defined by 
the things it is not—words that could have appeared in the same place 
but did not, such as “seen,” “loved,” “bought,” “burned,” and so on. 
Although the BYU corpora do provide ways of getting at similar 
parts of speech, the search screen gives no hint that a word’s meaning 
is constructed through contrasts in both syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
directions, and legal corpus writers have generally not investigated 
that paradigmatic axis. Academic corpus linguistics, meanwhile, 
“work[s] on the assumption that meaning is created on both 
[syntagmatic and paradigmatic] axes. . . . There is no reason why one 
should have a priority in meaning potential over the other.”81  
Figure 7. 
 
 81. JOHN SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT: LANGUAGE, CORPUS AND DISCOURSE 
170 (John Sinclair & Ronald Carter eds., 2004); see also infra Figure 7. 
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The legal corpus technique thus focuses on the syntagms that 
appear on the screen, not on the other possibilities and relationships 
that contextualize them and give them meaning. Treating language as 
being primarily about words in the utterance leads it to ignore the key 
role of paradigmatic relations in meaning, as well as the key role of 
genre conventions in linguistic usage.82  
Instead, legal corpus writers have generally treated corpora as 
internally undifferentiated. The COCA, for instance, is used to 
represent generically “ordinary” language use. Here, the technology 
itself does allow users to attend to genre: The COCA gives some genre 
specification, noting the broad category—newspaper, academic, 
spoken, and so on—a given result comes from. But legal corpus 
technique has not incorporated genre into its analysis. Instead, it treats 
ordinary usage as one-size-fits-all. In contrast, academic linguists 
have been attentive to genre distinctions within and between corpora. 
Indeed, as academic linguistics has demonstrated, different genres use 
even standard English differently—for instance by drawing on 
different kinds of lexical bundles and deploying them in different 
ways.83  
Similarly, as I discuss in Part I, academic linguists often use 
corpora to trace relationships—within texts, among texts, among 
people, and between speakers and texts. On this approach, focal texts 
are not so much bearers of unchanging meaning as means of forming 
relationships among texts and people: They distinguish genres, 
distribute information, inject individuality, and so on. Even when 
linguists focus on a single word used in a particular grammatical 
formation, like complementizer that, they are likely to be interested in 
the way the word works to distinguish some utterances from others, to 
structure the conveyance of meaning, and to affect the relationships of 
speech participants. They speak in terms of functions or effects. For 
instance, linguists might ask what complementizer that does in a 
sentence, how it works, and how it influences the ongoing flow of 
meaning-making that surrounds it, rather than to try to assign some 
ultimate meaning to the word or adjudicate which of many usages 
represented in a corpus should count as “ordinary.” Legal corpus 
writers, in contrast, tend to fixate on the question of individual word 
 
 82. See M. M. BAKHTIN, The Problem of Speech Genres, in SPEECH GENRES 
AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS 60, 60 (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W. 
McGee trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 1987).  
 83. See Biber, supra note 34, at 283. 
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meaning, and to treat meaning as something that inheres in the word 
itself, rather than in its functions and relationships.84  
This blithe assumption that words simply “have meaning” 
ignores the way that both meaning and usage depend integrally on 
social, and not just semantic or syntactic, context.85 When my host puts 
a plate down on the table between us and says, “That chocolate is 
delicious,” I am likely to understand that she is offering me the 
chocolate and encouraging me to try it as a part of her hospitality. But 
when, after I have taken a nibble, I respond with that same sentence, 
“That chocolate is delicious,” my host will likely understand that I am 
thanking her and showing appreciation, not offering her the chocolate 
as a demonstration of my hospitality. That is because the host–guest 
relationship functions as a kind of social-interactional genre that 
carries with it patterns of practice, somewhat presupposable 
interactional roles, stock phrases and presumptions, and so on. In 
short, it forms a “frame” within which people make and interpret 
utterances.86 So when my kid, after spending an hour in the 
supermarket helping me shop, points to the shelf by the checkout 
counter and says coyly, “That chocolate is delicious,” he is counting 
on me to work within the frame we jointly occupy and to understand 
that he means neither “please eat some” nor “thank you for your 
hospitality.” Just from our everyday lives, it is easy to see how 
pragmatics—the social situation of communication—affects meaning 
 
 84. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary 
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 795 (2018) (“Our thesis is that words have meaning, 
and that meaning can be theorized and measured using principles and methods devised 
in the field of linguistics.”). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Charles J. Fillmore and Beryl T. Atkins, Toward a Frame-Based 
Lexicon: The Semantics of RISK and its Neighbors, in FRAMES, FIELDS AND 
CONTRASTS: NEW ESSAYS IN SEMANTIC AND LEXICAL ORGANIZATION 76–77 (Adrienne 
Lehrer, Eva Feder Kittay & Richard Lehrer eds., 2012) (“[In s]emantic theories 
founded on the notion of cognitive frames or knowledge schemata. . . a word’s 
meaning can be understood only with reference to a structured background of 
experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a kind of conceptual prerequisite for 
understanding the meaning. Speakers can be said to know the meaning of the word 
only by first understanding the background frames that motivate the concept that the 
word encodes. Within such an approach, words or word senses are . . . related . . . only 
by way of their links to common background frames.”); see also Charles J. Fillmore, 
Frame Semantics, in COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: BASIC READINGS 373 (Dirk Geeraerts 
ed., 2006) (“By the term ‘frame’ I have in mind any system of concepts related in such 
a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure 
in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or 
into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available.”). 
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making and structures the semantic meanings and syntactic forms that 
interest legal corpus analysts. Yet pragmatics does not generally enter 
into those studies at all.  
The pragmatic contexts of laws are, of course, much weirder and 
more unusual than those in my chocolate-based examples. They occur 
only under very particular, very peculiar, conditions, structured by 
myriad rules, legal constraints, and traditions, within very specific 
social institutions peopled by very unordinary participants, and with 
effects on the world matched by no other speech act. That weirdness 
and rareness does not make pragmatic relations in law any less 
important. On the contrary, it should alert us to the difficulty of finding 
language use examples that would help evaluate the language of legal 
texts. Making claims about what legal terms mean in nonlegal 
contexts, in other words, may require more than simply investigating 
nonlegal contexts. We need reasons to believe that those nonlegal 
contexts give information about the legal texts they are used to 
examine.  
Work in legal corpus linguistics, for the most part, does not 
bother to justify or theorize the relationship between, say, a general 
corpus like the COCA and the highly unusual pragmatic 
circumstances of legal texts. It merely recites the familiar adage that 
legal language should be interpreted based on its ordinary usage. That 
view makes sense if words are meaning-containers that can be moved 
about like vases, retaining their integrity and their contents over 
different situations. But if paradigmatic, genre, and pragmatic contexts 
all change word usage and meaning—if a word is less like a meaning-
containing vase and more like a chameleon that retains structural 
integrity while changing color with its situation—then directly 
imputing the ordinary usage of one frame into another becomes more 
complicated. Legal corpus linguistics generally progresses on the 
word-as-vase assumption and does not discuss how changes to 
contexts and frames could affect the analysis of legal language. Yet 
linguistics itself has demonstrated that linguistic meaning involves 
multiple contexts—contexts that embed not only individual words but 
also one another. Legal corpus linguistics focuses most on the 
1282 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
syntagm, which is the most localized context and also the one most 




A legal corpus proponent might counter that it is courts, and not 
legal corpus scholars, who insist that we should interpret legal 
language according to its ordinary meaning. And indeed, the notion of 
ordinary meaning as a basis for legal interpretation has a long history 
in American law. For most of that history, however, courts have 
understood ordinary meaning in a negative sense as a way of helping 
rule out outlandish or implausible interpretations: “if a meaning can 
be the intended one in everyday usage, then that meaning passes the 
ordinary meaning test.”88 This “casual understanding of what is 
ordinary” differs from most legal corpus proponents’ attempts to use 
a corpus to glean the single real, correct, or truly ordinary meaning of 
 
 87. See infra Figure 8. This image is not meant to exhaustively show all the 
various contexts that go into creating linguistic meaning, but simply to illustrate some 
major meaning-making components.  
 88. Lawrence M. Solan, Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal 
Interpretation: Some Progress, Some Questions, 33 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 283, 286 
(2020); see id. at 287 (arguing that, in nineteenth century, the Court used “ordinary 
meaning to express the notion that in everyday speech, the meaning that the Court 
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a legal term, as opposed to simply indicating the wide range of ways 
a word can reasonably be used.89 
Legal corpus linguistic technology and technique thus build in a 
particular idea—one might even say ideology—of what legal 
language is and how it works.90 In this image, meaning is relatively 
simple to find and stable across populations, genres, and situations. 
Further, meaning inheres in words—and specifically words found in 
works of fiction, popular publication, academics, and national 
broadcast shows. And of course, the implication of using this 
technology is that it will help us answer the questions we pose.  
B. The Law in Legal Corpus Linguistics  
The questions we pose, in turn, are legal ones. And so it is worth 
thinking about what visions of the law legal corpus techniques embed. 
Again, any technology embeds presuppositions. These visions are not 
necessarily problematic or wrong—a successful lever will build in 
assumptions about gravity and mass that are very useful to moving 
things. But illuminating a technology’s presuppositions gives us a 
chance to determine whether we agree with them and what views we 
implicitly lend support to when we utilize the technology ourselves. 
The ideologies of language described in the previous section 
yield clues to the notion of law embedded in legal corpus work. As 
Don Kulick has written, “language ideologies seem never to be solely 
about language” so much as they are about other things that surround 
language use.91 Often those other things involve categories or groups 
to which a speaker is seen to belong: Language ideologies might 
predict how people of particular genders, races, or class backgrounds 
will speak, and reciprocally attribute particular speech patterns to the 
gender, race, or class background of particular speakers.92 In the case 
 
 89. See id. at 286. 
 90. As Michael Silverstein has noted, ideology—as a set of understandings 
that explain a phenomenon and allow people to orient their conduct and worldviews 
toward it—”is characteristic of any sociocultural phenomenon,” and “must inhere in 
what makes any social entity . . . cohere as that social entity”: “there is no such thing 
as a social fact without its ideological aspect.” Silverstein, supra note 15, at 313.  
 91. Don Kulick, Anger, Gender, Language Shift, and the Politics of 
Revelation in a Papua New Guinean Village, 2 PRAGMATICS 281, 295 (1992).  
 92. Paul V. Kroskrity, Language Ideologies, in A COMPANION TO LINGUISTIC 
ANTHROPOLOGY 496, 496 (Alessandro Duranti ed. 2004) (describing language 
ideologies as “situated, partial, and interested . . . conceptions and uses of language”) 
(quoting Joseph Errington, Ideology, in KEY TERMS IN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 110 
(Alessandro Duranti ed. 2001)). See generally BAMBI B. SCHIEFFELIN, LANGUAGE 
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of legal corpus research, ideologies of language merge with and enable 
ideologies of law. One might say that legal language ideology 
inscribes assumptions about how law itself speaks. 
In the preceding section, I explained how legal corpus linguistics 
presents language as primarily determined by the syntagmatic 
relations of individual words to the words around them, relying on 
frequency counts to declare which kind of syntagm wins. This vision 
of language, I argued, ignores some of the primary constituents of 
communication like paradigm sets, genre conventions, and pragmatic 
circumstances. Legal corpus linguistics does something similar with 
the concept of law.  
Legal corpus linguistics imagines law as primarily a written text, 
and specifically a written text that comes in clumps of one to four 
words. Those are the things whose meanings legal corpus writers seek 
by contextualizing them within a series of syntagms drawn from areas 
other than the law. The meaning of the law, meanwhile, is set from the 
start: It inheres in the individual words or word clumps, and it does 
not change over time or circumstance. It does not depend on its larger 
textual surroundings, so we need not look to the rest of the statute and 
ask how this provision makes sense in light of the statute’s overall 
project. And we need not ask what circumstances pushed Congress to 
make the enormous effort required to produce and enact a statute. 
What members of Congress understood the statute’s effects on 
the world to be is similarly irrelevant to this inquiry. With the 
important exception of Constitutional interpretation, legal corpus 
inquiry usually looks specifically to sources outside the legal realm, 
produced by people other than those who produce laws.93 So the way 
one law fits into or relates to other legal schema, as well as the way 
legal terms change through the ongoing process of legal interpretation 
itself, is erased: the words mean what the nonlegal corpus shows them 
 
IDEOLOGIES: PRACTICE AND THEORY (Kathryn A. Woolard & Paul V. Kroskrity eds., 
1998). 
 93. In contrast, legal corpus work in constitutional law routinely looks to 
contemporaneous legal materials and writing by those who were involved with 
producing, debating, or ratifying the Constitution. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who 
Are Officers of the United States, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 443 (2018) (looking to 
contemporaneous political and legal actors and practices to evaluate original meaning 
of the constitutional phrase “officers of the United States”). See generally Brief for 
Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 2 (using contemporaneous legal and political 
sources to evaluate the constitutional term “emoluments”). Legal corpus writers have 
not explained this differential treatment for constitutional and statutory law, but it 
does map on to the differential treatments given by statutory textualists and 
constitutional originalists.  
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meaning, not what they might have come to mean through the ongoing 
common-law process or through historical change to the social 
situation the law regulates.  
In this vision, legal words come prepackaged with meaning; the 
interpreter’s job is to unearth the true meaning that inheres in the 
words. In other words, for legal corpus linguistics, legal meaning is 
frozen at the time of enactment into words isolated from social, and 
even legal, surroundings. And we can know what that eternal frozen 
meaning is by looking to how those individual words are used by 
people who have nothing to do with producing or implementing the 
statute. 
These convictions stand in some tension with the common law 
system of American adjudication, which leaves legal texts open to 
recurring reinterpretation over time and creates pathways for 
meanings that are distinctly legal rather than ordinary.94 For an 
example, consider something as basic as the federal question 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.95 Both the Constitution and federal 
statute give federal courts jurisdiction over issues “arising under” 
federal law.96 But, as law students learn in their first-year civil 
procedure course, those words have come to mean different things in 
different contexts. The reach of Supreme Court jurisdiction under the 
Constitution “may extend to all cases in which a federal question is 
‘an ingredient’ of the action.”97 But a lower federal court may only 
entertain a civil suit if federal law is integral to the plaintiff’s ability 
to lodge her complaint and central to the court’s ability to decide it.98  
 
 94. See supra Figure 6.  
 95. Thanks to Mark Rosen for suggesting the arising-under example.  
 96. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, 
in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).  
 97. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986) 
(quoting Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824)).  
 98. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) 
(creating the “well-pleaded complaint” rule); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 
Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (holding that federal courts may 
exercise jurisdiction if the case “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually 
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state responsibilities”). Meanwhile, 
federal jurisdiction over criminal claims followed its own separate path. See Donald 
H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at Birth: A Comparative History of the Civil and 
Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some Proposals for 
Change, 19 VT. L. REV. 673, 673 (1995).  
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This odd situation routinely confounds civil procedure 
students.99 Yet the basic idea that the same words might mean one 
thing in the Constitution and another in a statute is not that hard to 
grasp. These phrases, though identical in their word composition, have 
lived separate jurisprudential lives, becoming interpreted and 
redefined over the course of iterative litigation-resolving moments. 
And they were introduced into their respective legal texts under 
different political and social circumstances, at different points in 
history, for different reasons. While arising-under jurisdiction was 
part of the Constitution in 1789, Congress did not write it into statute 
until 1875, after the experience of the Civil War had helped normalize 
an increased role for national government.100  
From the legal corpus linguistics standpoint, this example poses 
a bit of a conundrum. If individual words or small word bundles 
contain immutable legal meanings that can be discovered by looking 
to nonlegal syntagmatic arrangements in which these little texts 
appear, the different landing points of this same phrase become 
difficult to explain. Did the phrase “arising under” mean something 
significantly different among ordinary speakers—whoever they might 
be—in 1875 than it did in 1789? Did the ordinary speakers in 1789 
habitually use “arising under” to mean “implicated in” or “an 
ingredient of,” while the ordinary speakers of 1875 used it to mean a 
contrasting notion of “clearly required for” or “integral to,” the way 
Constitutional arising-under jurisdiction contrasts with statutory 
 
 99. The students are not wrong: Arising-under jurisdiction continues to pose 
puzzles for lawyers and scholars alike. See Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1667, 1668–69 (2007) (“Given the 
weighty doctrinal and pragmatic consequences that flow from determining whether a 
claim falls within the scope of § 1331, it is surprising to learn that we lack a coherent 
view of what statutory federal question jurisdiction entails.”).  
 100. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” 
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L. J. 263, 265 n.2 (2007). 
In 1875, Congress gave federal circuit courts jurisdiction of ‘all suits of a 
civil nature, at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their authority,’ subject to an amount-in-controversy requirement of five 
hundred dollars. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Following 
reenactments and reformulations of the 1875 act, federal district courts 
‘have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
law, or treaties of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
See id. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS (2015) (analyzing changes to legal 
understandings of national government authority in both north and south during the 
Civil War and its aftermath).  
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jurisdiction? It seems unlikely, and indeed a brief review of the 
relevant BYU corpora suggest no such thing.101  
If this inquiry seems like a very roundabout way to go about 
figuring out what “arising under” means, or should mean, in either the 
Constitution or the statute, that is because the legal corpus approach 
erases most of the stuff that gives these words meaning and 
differentiates the phrases from one another—history, social context, 
legal genealogy. Legal corpus linguistics, in other words, may indeed 
be quite useful for identifying the broad range of meanings a given 
word or word phrase could acceptably have had at some particular 
point in time—a “casual understanding of what is ordinary.”102 It can 
help determine if ordinary speakers at some particular time would 
have found the attribution of some particular meaning to a given word 
or phrase completely outlandish. But it cannot reveal what a given 
word or phrase should mean in a specific legal context because a 
corpus of instantiations does not reveal which of a multitude of 
acceptable uses is the one that should apply in some particular 
instance.  
For legal interpretation, though, we need to decide more than the 
broad range of uses that speakers would accept. We need to give the 
term meaning in the law at issue. Journals and newspapers cannot tell 
us what that ought to be. Legal corpus users, in contrast, routinely 
claim that corpus study reveals not just the range of potential uses of 
a word in general, but the best or most likely meaning of the word in 
its particular legal context. Such contentions, often presented as 
empirical findings about what a term actually means, in reality 
articulate normative positions about how we ought to interpret the 
term. 
Moreover, as soon as a legal text is written, the world around it 
changes. For one thing, a legal text—if it works—changes the world 
itself. Beyond that, though, people invent new machines, develop new 
 
 101. The Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA) lists 233 
instances of the phrase “arising under,” most of which have something to do with legal 
claims and the laws that support them. See Corpus of Founding Era American English 
(COFEA), supra note 52. Due to the nature of the COFEA, these examples primarily 
come from texts where people propose, debate, or discuss Constitutional or legal texts; 
this will not tell us how people not connected to the legal establishment used the 
phrase “arising under” under other circumstances. The Corpus of Historical American 
English (COHA) returns no results for “arising under” in the 1870s, when the 
jurisdiction statute was enacted. Most of the results for the 1860s and 1880s (ten each) 
are quotations or paraphrases of the constitutional or statutory language. See Corpus 
of Historical American English (COHA), supra note 51.  
 102. See Solan, supra note 88, at 286.  
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practices, and set new norms. They even develop new laws that form 
new contexts for existing statutes.103 The social, material, and legal 
world in which any legal text lives is constantly shifting under its feet. 
These normative convictions thus also stand in tension with the way 
laws continue to apply to the world around them even when that world 
changes, often in unpredictable ways, giving even old meanings a new 
significance because of changed circumstances—much the way “that 
chocolate is delicious” has a different social effect when spoken by a 
host than when spoken by a guest.104 Legal corpus technology and 
technique suggest that practitioners should ignore the essentially 
social nature of law, treating it instead as a purely linguistic 
endeavor—but a linguistic endeavor divorced from most of ways 
language usually gains meaning.  
These ideas about law should sound familiar. They are mainstays 
in textualism and originalism, prominent normative theories of legal 
interpretation. Textualism holds that the meaning of a legal text should 
be seen to inhere in its words only, and it particularly focuses on 
individual words or small word clumps. Originalism holds that the 
meaning of a legal text should be seen to always mean what its words 
would have meant to contemporaries when it was enacted. For both 
normative theories, the meaning of legal words should not be seen to 
change over time. Adherents to these normative theories have also 
emphasized that we should use ordinary language to interpret legal 
language. The technology and technique of legal corpus linguistics 
thus build in, as structuring presuppositions, the normative 
convictions of textualism and originalism. Where users do not 
acknowledge and account for that relationship, using this technology 
enacts those normative convictions.  
Legal corpus analysts might respond that they make no 
normative claims. Legal corpus analysis, on this telling, simply 
provides judges and other interpreters with information that they may 
use however they want, or not at all. In fact, legal corpus users might 
say they have no stake in the outcome of their research. They are just 
doing what judges—always on the lookout for ordinary meanings—
 
 103. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
161, 164 (2000) (holding that despite giving the Food and Drug Administration 
jurisdiction over “articles . . . intended to affect the structure [and] any function of the 
body,” the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act could not give the FDA jurisdiction over 
tobacco products—which are articles intended to affect the structure and function of 
the body—because subsequent statutes indicate that Congress did not wish to do so).  
 104. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE. JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994). 
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want them to do. They are a neutral party using a neutral technology 
to do neutral research that can then be used in various ways. 
As we have already seen, though, this claim is a bit unrealistic: 
Technologies of meaning are not neutral or passive. People doing legal 
corpus analysis may indeed be unbiased, in the sense that they do not 
necessarily favor one litigant or one litigation outcome over another.105 
But that hardly means the technology they use is somehow immune 
from the characteristics of technologies in general: building in 
worldviews, affecting conduct, distributing salience, and influencing 
the development of further ends. To evaluate legal corpus linguistics 
as a technology of interpretation, then, we should not get too hung up 
on the intentions of its users. Rather, we should consider what 
understandings of law and language the technology embodies, how it 
molds conduct, and what further questions it suggests and obscures.  
In the case of legal corpus linguistics, the techniques it employs 
and the answers it yields present legal meaning as something that 
inheres in words that sit in syntagms and can be discovered 
scientifically—rather than something that arises from a social world 
in which legal strictures are mobilized and have effects. This 
technology supports some existing normative claims in legal theory—
that legal meaning is a simple affair; that meaning inheres in one or a 
couple words and stays stable across social and historical contexts; 
and that figuring out what a statutory provision means is basically a 
matter of figuring out what each of its words or phrases mean, 
separately.  
Even if one does not consciously share those views, this 
technology of meaning-making can be very attractive. The interface is 
so clean. The results are so fast. It makes the project of legal 
interpretation, which can seem hopelessly muddled, seem finally 
doable, and maybe even easy. The way the inquiry is configured 
makes it look like the terrain around legal language does not change. 
 
 105. See Theodore M. Porter, Quantification and the Accounting Ideal in 
Science, 22 SOC. STUD. SCI. 633, 646 (1992) (arguing that the notion of objectivity, 
though sometimes equated simply with truth, is better understood as an ideal of 
“impersonality, standardization” that “reduc[es] subjectivity to a minimum”); see also 
Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective, 22 SOC. STUD. SCI. 
597, 597 (1992) (tracing the historical development of three conceptions of 
objectivity: (1) “ontological objectivity,” the pursuit of truth that revolves around “the 
fit between theory and the world;” (2) “mechanical objectivity,” the attempt to 
“suppress[]the universal human propensity to judge and aestheticize” by “forbid[ing] 
interpretation in reporting and picturing scientific results”; and (3) “aperspectival 
objectivity,” a related form that attempts to “eliminat[e] individual (or occasionally 
group) idiosyncrasies” by combining multiple approaches).  
1290 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
And of course, in that classic way in which technologies create paths 
for path dependence, a person using this technology can find it easy to 
narrow her focus away from the social production and effects of law 
and toward the individual words or phrases she plugs into the search 
bar. We have this wealth of objective, neutral information at our 
fingertips; it can feel natural to put it to use. The frictionless feel of 
this method pulls users toward its implicit claims about words, law, 
society, and change. In this way, decisions about how to interrogate 
legal texts can be mistaken for characteristics of the text itself.  
IV. PUTTING LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS IN AN INTERPRETIVE 
ECOLOGY 
Having thought about some of the presuppositions and 
entailments of this technology, we can also place it in a larger ecology 
of meaning-production technologies. Here, I choose just two 
comparators to sketch how that might work. These comparators 
themselves present a stark contrast: dictionaries on the one hand, 
administrative decision-making on the other.  
Each of these might appear at first glance to be something other 
than a technology. Compared to computer programs, dictionaries 
seem so stodgy, so unidimensional, so physical. On the other hand, 
administrative procedures seem more like a party: social events that 
involve lots of people over lots of time, not at all like the solitary act 
of plugging in a search term and seeing what the corpus yields. Yet 
each of these is a meaning-making machine just like legal corpus 
research. Each gives people a way to attribute meaning to legal 
language by recourse to something other than the legal language itself. 
There is, in other words, no good reason to limit the comparison to 
options that strongly resemble legal corpus methods. On the contrary, 
comparing legal corpus work to things that look a lot like legal corpus 
work would not give us much information about what sets legal corpus 
work apart and what we gain or lose by choosing it as opposed to other 
ways of making meaning.106  
 
 106. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the 
Critics, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (2021) (comparing legal corpus linguistics to 
judicial intuitions, dictionary use, etymologies, and canons of construction, but 
excluding interpretive technologies that do not abstract small word bundles from their 
statutory context).  
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A. Dictionaries 
Dictionaries have figured prominently in discussions of statutory 
interpretation.107 And several legal corpus proponents have, in private 
communications with me, defended their work as at least better than 
dictionaries, which judges are free to use anyway. So it seems 
worthwhile to compare the two technologies explicitly.  
Legal corpus work undeniably provides more information about 
how a given word or word bundle is used in some range of 
communicative situations than a dictionary does. Yet these 
technologies of meaning-making bear some important resemblances 
as well. For instance, using a dictionary to determine the meaning of 
a statutory term encourages users to focus on individual words or very 
small word bundles, rather than the overarching contexts in which 
those words gain meaning and have social effect. This limited focus 
becomes apparent in the way judges use dictionary definitions, which 
differs from how an everyday reader of, say a novel, normally would.  
When I come across an unfamiliar term, I might go to a 
dictionary to help me understand it. Personally, I like to use a tattered 
American Heritage I have had since I was a kid, but these days I might 
simply type the term into my search engine query bar and see what 
pops up. When I have a couple of definitions, I go back to the text I 
am reading and decide how the dictionary’s entries would make the 
most sense in the context of the thing I am reading. If the definitions 
do not instantly clarify things, I know that I have to make decisions 
about which definition makes the most sense in, and of, the context. I 
also may need to decide whether a definition that combines aspects of 
several dictionary entries or follows a tangent implied by some entry 
would make more sense than the specific entries the dictionaries 
yielded. Even after getting some general ideas from a dictionary, in 
other words, I still have to make crucial decisions about what I think 
this word should mean in the specific place I encounter it. One might 
say I treat a dictionary definition as a springboard, a reminder, or a 
pointer—but not as an answer that I insist the text must fit.  
 
 107. Scholars have found, however, that lower courts use dictionaries much 
less than Supreme Court Justices do. See generally James J. Brudney & Lawrence 
Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013); John Calhoun, Note, 
Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court 
Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484 (2014); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, 
Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeals, YALE L.J.F. 104 (2015). 
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In contrast, when courts use dictionaries, they often proceed as 
though one could—or even must—simply transplant a dictionary 
definition into a text without making any decisions about how the 
word at issue would make the most sense. That is, courts sometimes 
treat the dictionary as obviating the court’s own obligation to give 
meaning to the statute—as though a court’s work were to make the 
statute conform to whatever dictionary entries it collects, rather than 
to use the dictionary entries to help decide what the statute should 
mean.  
The oddity of this approach comes through nicely in Chapman 
v. United States, where the Supreme Court interpreted a statutory 
provision that imposed a mandatory minimum prison sentence on a 
person who distributed more than one gram of a “mixture or 
substance” containing LSD.108 Unlike drugs such as heroin or cocaine, 
which can be sold pure or cut with some substance that dilutes them, 
LSD in its pure form weighs so little that it must be sold on a carrier.109 
The drug is “dissolved in a solvent such as alcohol, and . . . the 
solution” is then dripped or sprayed onto something that is easier to 
divide and distribute—often paper or sugar cubes, but potentially 
many other things.110 The alcohol eventually evaporates, leaving pure 
LSD in the paper, sugar cube, or other carrier. A user ingests the 
carrier to get the LSD dose.  
Should the paper, sugar cube, or other thing onto which the LSD 
and alcohol solution has been dripped count as part of the drug 
“mixture or substance” when determining whether a defendant had 
distributed more than one gram? Chapman’s majority opinion sought 
the answer in dictionaries. One dictionary defined “mixture” as 
combining components that “however thoroughly commingled[,] are 
regarded as retaining a separate existence.”111 Another described it as 
“two substances blended together so that the particles of one are 
diffused among the particles of the other.”112 Rather than using these 
dictionaries as a springboard for deciding how this provision fit into 
the statute’s overall aims, effects, and other provisions, the opinion 
treated the definitions as boxes into which the statutory text must be 
stuffed. The majority decided that the carrier formed part of a mixture 
 
 108. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 455 (1991) (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. See id. at 455, 459–60. 
 110. See id. at 457.  
 111. Id. at 462 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1449 (1986)).  
 112. Id. (quoting 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)). 
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with LSD. Since LSD stays “inside” the carrier, “commingled” but not 
“chemically combine[d] with [it],” and could “be released by dropping 
the [carrier] into a liquid or by swallowing [it],” the drug “retain[ed] a 
separate existence,” just like the first dictionary entry said.113 But since 
“LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper,” the carrier “cannot 
be distinguished” from the LSD “nor easily separated from it,” as the 
second definition held.114 
The majority’s two conclusions—that LSD (1) stays separate 
from its carrier to be released upon contact with water, and (2) is not 
distinguishable or easily separated from its carrier—are mutually 
contradictory. But the opinion betrayed no recognition of the 
incompatible qualities it attributed to the drug. Instead of treating the 
dictionary definitions as an indication of the types of things the word 
mixture might mean, considering which versions might make the most 
sense in the context of the statute, and then justifying its conclusions 
on legal or policy grounds, the majority treated the dictionary 
definitions it had chosen as criteria that the statutory words had to fit.  
This is not how most people use dictionaries in everyday life. 
We understand that texts are not written to fit dictionary definitions. 
And we recognize that definitions in dictionaries are general and 
illustrative, while the meanings of words in the texts we interpret 
depend on their specific contexts.  
Courts using dictionaries to interpret legal language thus often 
use techniques that are analogous to those used in legal corpus 
analysis. They take a word out of its statutory context, put it in the 
context of illustrative examples of general usage, find commonalities 
in those examples, and then attribute those commonalities back to the 
specific use at issue. And they treat the word (or short word-bundle) 
as the primary unit of meaning, to the exclusion of paradigm relations, 
genre conventions, pragmatic contexts, and so on.  
By allowing users to render invisible the numerous 
determinative contexts in which legal language takes shape and force, 
dictionaries do indeed share some of legal corpus work’s thin, limited 
image of how meaning is produced. Because dictionaries provide 
much less information than a corpus search, though, and because they 
do not provide a lot of raw data, they may give users less of a sense of 
false mastery than a corpus search. That is, the presuppositions they 
build in may be less powerful and the entailments less totalizing. Plus, 
some dictionaries provide a picture of language change over time 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
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when they give examples from different historical periods, showing 
clearly how even solo words continually change. So there are plusses 
and minuses to each one. Dictionaries may provide less, but they claim 
less too.  
B. Agencies 
The preceding section put legal corpus linguistics in the context 
of its close cousin, dictionary consultation. But given their close 
relationship, leaving the comparison there would be unnecessarily 
limiting. What we want, after all, is not a better dictionary. What we 
want are good ways of attributing meaning to legal texts that suit our 
ideas about both law and text. As Daryl Levinson has pointed out in 
another context, how we draw the borders of our analysis determines 
what we see.115 So it makes sense to look further afield. In this section, 
I consider a pervasive but quite different technology of legal meaning-
production: administrative rulemaking.  
One thing that legal corpus linguistics shares with dictionary 
consultation is that both are generally offered as technologies for use 
by individual judges. A judge pondering a legal decision can go to the 
dictionary and look up some key terms, or go to the computer and type 
a few entries into the corpus. The prototypical image of statutory 
interpretation echoes the wonderful Wallace Stevens poem: “The 
house was quiet and the world was calm. / The reader became the 
book.”116 This is a beautiful and inspiring image. But Stevens probably 
 
 115. See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 
YALE L.J. 1311, 1313–14 (2002) (arguing that the viability of a public law claim of 
right infringement depends on how observers decide to “frame” the relevant 
“transaction,” a choice that precedes decisions about how to apply or interpret the 
right itself).  
 116. Wallace Stevens, The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm, in THE 
PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS AND A PLAY 279, 279 (Holly Stevens 
ed., 1990). The poem, well worth reproducing in full:  
The house was quiet and the world was calm.  
The reader became the book; and summer night  
 
Was like the conscious being of the book.  
The house was quiet and the world was calm.  
 
The words were spoken as if there was no book, 
Except that the reader leaned above the page, 
 
Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be 
The scholar to whom his book is true, to whom 
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did not have statutes in mind. Statutes are speech acts: they accomplish 
things in the world. We may strive to understand what they really 
say—to become, as the poem says, the book and the truth. But in the 
end, the effect of interpreting is to determine how statutes get 
implemented, that is, how it is that they accomplish things in the world. 
Moreover, the image of a judge reading in a quiet chambers 
belies the cacophony that attends statutory interpretation in practice. 
In reality, there is no one person—not even a three-judge panel—who 
gets to interpret the true meaning of the statute. This inherent 
multiplicity arises not only because judicial interpretations of statutes 
only happen within the adversarial context of litigation. It also comes 
about because most efficacious statutory interpretation is done not by 
courts but by agencies.117 Administrative agencies do more statutory 
interpretation than courts, and most administrative interpretations are 
never reviewed by a court.118 A number of scholars have considered 
how agency interpretation might differ from that of courts, and 
whether it should.119 Empirical investigation into how agencies 
actually do that work is in its infancy, but what we already know 
 
 
The summer night is like a perfection of thought. 
The house was quiet because it had to be. 
 
The quiet was part of the meaning, part of the mind: 
The access of perfection to the page. 
 
And the world was calm. The truth in a calm world, 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there. 
Id. 
 117. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: 
A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 
501–03 (2005). 
 118. See id.; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 227 (2006).  
 119. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
355, 358 (2012); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in 
Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 92 (2009); Elizabeth V. Foote, 
Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the 
Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2007); 
Mashaw, supra note 117, at 503; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation 
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge 
Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility To Read: Agency Interpretation and 
the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1990). 
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suffices to disrupt the house-is-quiet image of a reader reaching a true 
understanding of a text.120 
Administrative rulemaking is a vast and complex enterprise with 
different agencies taking different approaches at different times. But 
there are some key similarities worth considering in a comparison to 
legal corpus linguistics. One striking characteristic: Agency 
interpretation involves a lot of people. Indeed, even the basic 
requirements that structure rulemaking require agencies to take and 
respond to input from anyone who cares to comment on proposed 
rules.121 Agencies also routinely gather numerous people to develop 
rules based on statutes, involving discussions over substantial periods 
of time, as multiple administrators collect information, do research, 
outline policy priorities, consider legal requirements, and assess 
Congressional reactions to potential rules.122 Moreover, decisions 
about rulemaking routinely involve many actors within the 
administrative state, taking input from an agency’s program offices, 
policy experts, legal professionals, legislative liaisons, White House 
representatives, and more. A single decision might travel up and down 
this multifarious hierarchy as the agency decides whether to pursue a 
 
 120. See Mashaw, supra note 117, at 501–02 (“[V]irtually no one has even 
asked, much less answered, some simple questions about agency statutory 
interpretation: As a factual matter, how do agencies interpret statutes?”); see also 
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 905 (2013) (noting a similar paucity of empirical evidence for 
legislative drafting practices and presenting groundbreaking interview-derived 
evidence on that topic); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1377, 1378–79, 1382 (2017); Christopher J. Walker, Lawmaking Within 
Federal Agencies and Without Judicial Review, 32 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 551, 552, 
557–59 (2017); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 999, 1012 (2015); Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical 
Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 
518 (2017); Jarrod Shobe, Agency Legislative History, 68 EMORY L.J. 283, 286 
(2018). 
 121. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 
F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 122. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA 
Rulemaking, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 62–64 (1991) (noting that EPA rulemaking 
routinely involves scientists, environmental engineers, managers, enforcement 
professionals, economists, policy analysts, lawyers, and members of external affairs 
or legislative affairs offices); Glen Staszewski & Michael Sant’Ambrogio, 
Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 823–36 (2021) 
(surveying numerous ways agencies engage the public in rule development). 
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policy, drafts a proposed rule, responds to comments, and publishes 
the final rule.123  
This process poses a stark contrast to the calm, quiet world in 
which interpreting is often imagined. It speaks instead of the 
cacophony that attends most statutory interpretation in practice. Legal 
interpretation usually involves many—perhaps hundreds—of people, 
working in different ways on different aspects of an issue, iteratively 
confronting and resolving problems, disagreements, incoherencies, 
and values choices.  
This work can be said to produce an emergent institutional 
consolidation around a statutory meaning. Despite the complex and 
multi-participant process that goes into producing this institutional 
consolidation, moreover, no one can be under many illusions about its 
finality or permanence. The potential for change is baked into the 
system, as agencies wield ongoing authority over the statutes they 
implement, rendering every interpretation potentially subject to a new 
and different institutional consolidation down the line. Such stability 
within change resembles the common law system’s built-in flexibility. 
If anything, given the widespread recognition that agency 
interpretations can and do change, it lacks the common law system’s 
illusory claims to finality.124 
This image also suggests that, in the statutory realm, the question 
of interpretation may be inseparable from the question of 
implementation. Statutes, after all, are not just things that mean. They 
are things that do.125 The idea of “understanding” a statute may be 
incoherent if it is divorced from the idea of effectuating or 
implementing it. And since lawsuits determine how a statute will act 
 
 123. In separate research, Cristina Rodríguez and I have been conducting 
interviews on statutory interpretation and policy formulation practices with federal 
agency personnel. This description is drawn from some of those interviews.  
 124. For example, the potential for changed interpretation has become a 
mainstay of judicial doctrine. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (holding, in a challenge to an agency’s changed 
statutory interpretation, that courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n 
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000–01 (2005) (holding that courts should 
defer to an agency’s reasonable reinterpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision 
even when a court had previously upheld a different interpretation by that agency as 
reasonable). 
 125. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text; see also Austin, supra 
note 23, at 6–7; Searle, supra note 23, at 16; MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS 
OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS 18–19 (2014). 
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on the ground, effectuating or implementing is what judges do, too, 
whether they phrase it that way or not.  
The multiplicity inherent in agency legal interpretation finds 
echoes in the multiplicity of legal corpus work. Legal corpus work, 
too, seeks paths away from the centrality of individual judges and their 
internal states and intuitions. It, too, looks instead to multiple voices. 
But it looks not to the voices of people participating in the ongoing 
social practice of giving statutes meaning, but to those in the corpus. 
And it treats this multiplicity differently than agency interpreters do. 
Legal corpus work does not provide for debate or disagreement the 
way that the multiparty discursive process of agency interpretation 
does. Instead, legal corpus analysts look to multiplicity as a path to 
averaging out differences and providing clear answers about enduring 
underlying meanings—meanings that already inhere in statutory 
language waiting to be discovered.  
Both agency procedures and legal corpus linguistics are 
machines for giving meaning to law. Both take into account factors 
beyond a judge’s intuitions. Yet, we see how the images of law, 
language, and technology they rest on are quite dissimilar. Legal 
corpus linguistics presents itself as a fast, simple, automated 
technology of meaning-discovery. Agency interpretation is a slow, 
complex, messy, and very human process of meaning-making. Legal 
corpus linguistics presents law itself as primarily a text with 
predetermined meanings that can be deduced from its relationship to 
surrounding text in a confined data space. Agency interpretation treats 
legal meaning-making as a social event in a data-diversified 
environment, inherently subject to development and change. Perhaps 
most strikingly, legal corpus linguistics presents legal texts as always 
already having whatever meanings they were meant to have. Agency 
interpretation, in contrast, treats legal text as a social phenomenon that 
must be given meaning through the discursive interaction of many 
individuals, interests, viewpoints, and preferences. It imagines law as 
a social force enacted through social practices.  
Of course, judges do not have the personnel or the authority to 
undertake the kind of ongoing research, debate, and decision-making 
that agencies do. Yet choosing a different model for legal 
interpretation could affect judicial interpretive choices. Rather than 
seeking the real meaning of a word in a database, judges can consider 
how the legal text has developed, what goals it furthers, and what 
effects different interpretations would have on the world. These kinds 
of considerations are not foreign to legal interpretation; on the 
contrary, they permeate the work of agencies, our primary interpreters 
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of law. Of course, not every agency interpretation process takes every 
perspective into account or fulfills its promise of rationality.126 But the 
model of interpretation, our image of what prototypical interpretation 
looks like, makes a difference in how we choose and evaluate the 
technologies available for it.  
Those turning to legal corpus linguistics may strive to emulate 
the kind of empirical, grounded, and realistic approach to meaning-
making that agencies have developed. Yet choosing which technology 
to favor also commits us, to some extent, to the premises that 
technology builds in. It is thus worth asking what image of legal 
process rings most true, and most desirable, as we evaluate our 
options. Looking for the meaning of law in words isolated from their 
broader legal context, as legal corpus work does, seems to evacuate 
the law-ness from law. In contrast, understanding that legal meaning 
comes about through the interplay of collaborating and conflicting 
social forces comports better to our experience of law as it wends its 
way through iterative judicial decisions and ongoing administrative 
procedures—not to mention as it is negotiated on the ground in 
discretionary interactions and debated in various forums. Viewing 
judicial legal interpretation in a broader setting can thus provide 
insight into the range of things legal interpretation can be. It can also 
raise productive questions about what legal interpretation should be, 
pushing commentators out of easy assumptions based on current 
judicial practice and ideology. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal corpus linguistics, a newly popular technology of legal 
interpretation, promises a quick, simple answer to the puzzle of legal 
meaning. It is worth noting what a very odd promise this is. The social 
and political processes that go into producing, enforcing, litigating, 
and understanding the law are extremely complex. Why would a 
quick, simple answer be the best fit for that complexity? Rather than 
looking for clear, ultimate conclusions, we should prefer technologies 
of legal meaning-making that take into account law’s inherent 
complexity.  
 
 126. See Anya Bernstein, Differentiating Deference, 33 YALE J. REG. 1, 52 
(2016) (arguing that courts reviewing agency action should take into account whether 
the agency utilized its competence rather than assuming that agencies will always use 
all the competence they potentially have at their disposal). 
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Taking that complexity into account might mean giving up the 
notion that legal meaning inheres in individual words or small word 
clumps whose meaning does not change over time. But that notion is 
not necessary to the project of legal interpretation. Rather, it is a 
preference of some specific normative approaches to law, most 
forcefully expressed in the theories of textualism and originalism. 
These theories may be attractive because of the view of law, politics, 
or normative order that they present. But we should be clear that they 
do not describe some quality of language or communication that 
inheres in legal meaning. Rather, they express a normative position 
about how we ought to go about giving meaning to law. Just so, legal 
corpus linguistics, for all its reliance on databases, does not tell us 
what legal language really means. It too expresses a normative 
position about how we ought to go about giving meaning to law.  
As Latour argues, truths—that is, those things that come to look 
like truths—emerge from complex, multi-participant processes of 
messy clash and cooperation. It is the participants of communicative 
events who actively create meanings for linguistic utterances. Legal 
language benefits from being involved in many such meaning-creating 
contexts. From legal drafting and enactment to implementation to 
popularization to adjudication, the process of giving meaning to law 
involves hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people. In some sense, 
legal corpus linguistics, with its penchant for large data sets with 
millions of exemplars, seems like a natural fit for analyzing the kind 
of complex, multilateral social processes that go into the creation of 
legal meaning.  
Yet, as currently practiced, legal corpus linguistics instead 
brackets the social practices that actually give meaning to law in our 
society. It looks to words that live in unrelated social worlds—novels, 
newspapers, radio shows, and so on. In doing so, it ignores both the 
contexts and the participants that give law meaning, and it treats legal 
language as somehow inherently meaningful. If we see law not as a 
collection of separable words with a clear right answer but as an actant 
whose effect on the world requires the ongoing participation of 
different groups—those who enforce, interpret, obey, obstruct, and so 
on—we may be more attracted to meaning-making technologies that 
place law in more relational and practical contexts. We often look to 
technology to simplify our work. But sometimes we may be better 
served by technologies that recognize its true complexity. 
 
